proposed by the State in view of the lack of suitable mechanisms that would permit an adequate solution to the conflict. In addition, they indicated that measures had been taken at the administrative, judicial and legislative level that had not achieved the desired effects, even though interinstitutional commissions had been created, complaints had been filed, and funds had been requested from the National Congress to free the land of encumbrances. Therefore, 21 years after the conflict had commenced, it was evident that the actions taken by the State had been sporadic and ineffective and resulted in complete lack of protection for the community. 229. In its answering brief, the State denied having violated the right to a simple and effective remedy because documentation existed showing that the Punta Piedra community and its members had availed themselves of the procedures established in the laws of Honduras, and that their requests had been answered, as in the case of those submitted to INA and the Public Prosecution Service. It also indicated that Honduran laws “establishe[d] the right to a simple and prompt recourse, or any other simple [and] effective recourse to a competent judge or court for protection against acts that violate fundamental rights […].” 230. In its brief with final arguments, the State reintroduced arguments it had presented during the admissibility procedure before the Commission, in which it indicated that the commitments made as a result of the ad hoc commissions were similar to an “out-of-court conciliation” equivalent to res judicata. Therefore, payment of the sum agreed on by the public administration should have been sought using the administrative mechanism established in articles 146 to 149 of the Law on Administrative Procedure before resorting to a civil action. In the same brief, the State argued that if someone does not comply with an obligation, it was through the courts that compliance should be sought and Honduras was not an exception. In addition, the State argued that the Punta Piedra community’s right to land was the same as that of any other Honduran national, because it was not an original indigenous people. Consequently, the State indicated that it was for private law and the civil courts to resolve the land dispute that existed, through a civil action demanding ownership, by “declaratory proceedings,” and even the Rio Miel inhabitants could have claimed acquisitive prescription or usucaption, because they had occupied the said territories for more than 20 years. Additionally, the State indicated, in general, that the amparo proceeding, regulated in article 183 of the Constitution, was another remedy available, as well as “other guarantees and remedies that [could have been] used,” without specifying them or describing their content. B. Considerations of the Court 231. The Court has indicated repeatedly that States Parties are obliged to provide effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8(1)), all in keeping with the general obligation of those States to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to all persons subject to their jurisdiction (Art. 1). 248 The absence of an effective remedy for the violation of the Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez, Preliminary objections, supra, para. 91, and Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 5, 2015. Series No. 302, para. 245. 248 66