loss of the authority and credibility that are essential for the organs responsible for administering the system for the protection of human rights.”31 44. The foregoing leads naturally to the conclusion that it is not possible to suppose that allegations of a violation of rights that have been declared inadmissible by the Commission in its admissibility report have been submitted to the consideration of the Court. The provisions of the Court’s Rules of Procedure must always be interpreted in accordance with of the Convention. In this specific case, Article 35 of these Rules of Procedure must be interpreted in relation to Articles 46 and 47 of the Convention, so that the “facts that allegedly give rise to a violation” (Article 35(1)) and the “facts contained in the report” on merits (Article 35(3)) cannot include allegations that have been considered inadmissible by the Commission and, in particular, facts regarding which domestic remedies have not been exhausted, unless the requirement of prior exhaustion of such remedies is not applicable. 45. Consequently, although the Commission stated that it had submitted to the Court all the facts described in merits report No. 84/10 of July 13, 2010, including those that refer to factual aspects relating to supposed irregularities in the criminal proceedings,32 regarding which the Commission itself concluded that domestic remedies had not been exhausted in its report of March 20, 2009, those aspects have not been submitted to the Court validly. This conclusion is corroborated taking into account that the Commission did not include the arguments concerning those factual aspects in the legal analysis of its merits report (supra para. 42). 46. Therefore, it is not incumbent on the Court to rule on the following legal arguments presented by the representative, which are based on factual aspects that, at the time of the admissibility stage, were excluded from the merits proceedings: (a) the alleged existence of coerced or false statements; (b) the alleged seizure and transfer of evidence which did not comply with the applicable legal provisions; (c) the alleged presentation of expert evidence that was vitiated and subject to annulment, and (d) the alleged change in the legal definition of the facts at the time of the judgment convicting Mr. Díaz Peña. 31 Case of Cayara v. Peru. Preliminary objections. Judgment of February 3, 1993. Series C No. 14, para. 63, and Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Preliminary objections. Judgment of November 18, 1999. Series C No. 61, para. 42. See also, Case of González Medina and family v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 27, 2012. Series C No. 240, para. 28. 32 For example, in paragraphs 54, 55, 62 and 71 of this report on the factual determinations, the Commission indicated the following: a) “On September 12, 2003, Raúl José Díaz Peña appeared before the CICPC to be interviewed during which he indicated that, on September 10, 2003, ‘between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m.’ a DISIP team came to his house with a warrant from the Prosecutor to seize his yellow Toyota Samuray pickup truck in order to perform forensic testing on it. The DISIP agents who seized it told him that expert tests would be carried out on the pickup truck that same day and that he could come to this agency at 2 p.m. When Raúl José Díaz Peña arrived at the DISIP headquarters at 2 p.m., the expert testing had already begun, therefore they complained to the Sixty-second Prosecutor, who continued with the procedure.” b) “As recorded in the expert report of November 5, 2003, the designated expert concluded that “the whitish waxy substance present in the sweeps examined and indicated, respectively, as No. 1 (cargo space) and No. 2 (rear floor - left side) corresponds to the powerful explosive known as C4 or HARRISITE”; c) “On June 15, 2004, the 11th First Instance Examining Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area […] declared, inter alia, that the objections and requests for annulment proposed by Raúl José Díaz Peña’s legal counsel were inadmissible. On July 6, 2004, the Sixty-second Auxiliary Prosecutor of the Caracas Metropolitan Area, Sol Leylimar Domínguez Alvarenga, ruled with regard to the request for annulment made by Raúl José Díaz Peña's defense counsel and requested that the decision issued by the 11th First Instance Examining Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area be confirmed,” and d) “On December 2, 2005, a proceeding was held to conduct the hearing of the oral public trial against Raúl José Díaz Peña and [one other person] before the 22nd First Instance Trial Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area […]. During this proceeding [the other person prosecuted] declared that […] he was obliged to make a video accusing some individuals, including Raúl Díaz.” 14