restrictive measure” than preventive detention be applied until the oral proceedings were held. To this end, he cited article 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,95 and stated that “the maximum duration of preventive detention” had been exceeded,” and that “it could never last more than two years,” unless an extension had been granted, and that this had not even been requested by the Public Prosecution Service. He added that the purpose of the norm was “to ensure that the State [was] diligent in the prosecution of offenses and not to keep individuals in prison without trial,” and that the delays in the case could not be attributed to him.”96 77. On March 29, 2006, the Twenty-third First Instance Trial Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area declared the review of the measure of deprivation of liberty irreceivable.97 To this end, it stated, in particular, that “the procedural delay c[ould] not be attributed to [the said] court; that “the two years required in order to grant a less severe measure ha[d] not been completed,” and that, pursuant to judgment 3421 of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of November 9, 2005, “crimes against humanity, illegal human rights violations, and war crimes were excluded from benefiting, as were alternative precautionary measures if the judge considered that the deprivation of liberty of the accused was in order.”98 It did not explain the grounds of which it classified the offenses with which Mr. Díaz Peña was charged in this way, or why it affirmed that the two years of preventive detention had not elapsed. In addition, the said court indicated that the case law of the Constitutional Chamber “did not denature the presumption of innocence, but rather the accused in this case must prove this during the oral and public debate.”99 78. On April 17, 2006, Mr. Díaz Peña’s defense counsel appealed the decision of March 29, 2006, before the Court of Appeal of the Caracas Metropolitan Area, reiterating and expanding the justification for the original request and, in particular, questioning the classification of the crimes with which he was charged as crimes against humanity, human rights violations, or war crimes, and indicating that the application filed was not to request the review of the measure, as the decision appealed had stated, but “for a ruling to be made regarding the fact that, when it has been verified that the duration of the detention indicated in article 244(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been fulfilled without the State having concluded the proceedings in which he is 95 The said norm establishes: Article 244. Proportionality. A measure of personal coercion may not be ordered when this may appear disproportionate in relation to the gravity of the offense, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the probable punishment. In no case may it be more than the minimum punishment established for each offense, or exceed two years. Exceptionally, the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the complainant may request the examining judge to order an extension which may not exceed the minimum punishment established for the offense, in order to maintain the measures of personal coercion that are about to expire, when there are serious reasons for this, which must be duly founded by the prosecutor or the complainant. In this case, the examining judge must summon the accused and the parties to an oral hearing in order to make a ruling, taking into account the principle of proportionality in order to establish the length of the extension. Code of Criminal Procedure (evidence file, tome XXVI, folio 17526). 96 Cf. Request for the substitution of the judicial measure of preventive detention presented by Raúl José Díaz Peña, on March 24, 2006 (evidence file, tome XV, folios 9211 to 9215). 97 Cf. Ruling of the Twenty-third First Instance Trial Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area on March 29, 2006 (evidence file, tome XV, folios 9231 to 9240). 98 Ruling of the Twenty-third First Instance Trial Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area on March 29, 2006 (evidence file, tome XV, folios 9231 to 9240). 99 Ruling of the Twenty-third First Instance Trial Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area on March 29, 2006 (evidence file, tome XV, folios 9231 to 9240). 25