18 [Z]ayed had authorized either the interference with [or] the recording of […] such telephone conversation.” Finally, it argued that “the States must adopt the necessary measures to create a legal system which is adequate to deter the occurrence of ‘arbitrary or abusive’ interference with the right to privacy or to a private life.” 59. The representatives added that the legislation which regulates tapping and recording telephone conversations: a) “did [n]ot establish any standards whereby to describe an offense as serious, [nor] did it expressly establish the procedures to be followed to examine and use the information obtained by wiretapping a telephone conversation;” b) Law No. 23 dated December 30, 1986 does not establish time limits for the interference, nor the obligation that such interference be authorized by a Court organ, that is, both prior judicial checks and political checks are lacking; c) “the vagueness of existing regulations regarding this matter allowed the Procurador General de la Nación [National Attorney General] much leeway to take actions which were not subject to any checks. This […] put Panamanians in a situation of legal uncertainty derived from the ample powers vested in the Attorney General, which resulted in specific violations to the detriment of some individuals, […] including, of course, […] the case of Santander Tristán;” and d) “at the time the facts described in the instant case occurred, there were no other regulations in Panamá regarding the privilege of communications, and standards regulating interference with telephone communications had not as yet been established by case law.” They concluded that the Panamanian State, due to the lack of adequate, accurate, and clear legislation to regulate interference with telephone communications, failed to fulfill its obligation to adapt its domestic legislation therefore as to secure the right of Mr. Tristán Donoso not to be subjected to arbitrary interference with his private life. 60. The State alleged that, “it has been conclusively established that the Procurador General de la Nación [National Attorney General] […] did not order the wiretapping and recording of the telephone conversation of July 8, 1996. Accordingly, there was no “arbitrary or abusive interference” with the private life of Mr. Tristán Donoso committed by the aforementioned Procurador General de la Nación [National Attorney General],” and pointed out that “Mr. Santander Tristán […] knew that the recording had been made by his client, [Adel Zayed, who], inadvertently gave an additional cassette […] to Inspector Hurtado without being acquainted with its contents, [delivering the cassette with the recording of the telephone conversation in question] unknowingly.” * * * 61. The Court recalls that at the public hearing the parties agreed that it had not been proven that the former Attorney General had ordered the wiretapping and recording of the telephone conversation of July 8, 1996 between the alleged victim and Mr. Adel Zayed. In view of this, it is not necessary to make any additional considerations on this matter. 62. Notwithstanding, this circumstance in itself does not exempt the State from its international responsibility if from the evidence submitted by the parties it result that another State agent is responsible for the wiretapping and recording of such telephone conversation. So, the Court will examine the body of evidence in the instant case.