and the assumptions based on which it must be compensated. Thus, the Court will determine the pertinence of awarding pecuniary reparations and the respective amounts due in this case. Before this, since a dispute still exist on alleged compensation already granted under the National Reparations Program (hereinafter “PNR”), the Court will now rule on this matter. D.1. Compensation granted under the National Reparations Program 297. The State asked that some of the victims who had been provided with reparation under the National Reparations Program be considered “duly compensated.” The State also indicated its willingness to “provide financial redress” to the victims of this case who had not been compensated previously. During the public hearing the State reiterated its willingness to provide reparation to the victims who had not been compensated; however, it indicated that it would do so “includ[ing them] under the reparations items of the National Reparations Program.” 298. The Commission asked the Court to order the State to “[m]ake adequate reparation for the human rights violations declared in the [merits] report both in the form of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, including just compensation.” In addition, it appreciated the measures taken by the State to implement the National Reparations Program (supra para. 300), under which compensation had been granted to some of the victims in the instant case. However, according to the Commission, “this program does not guarantees that [… the victims of human rights violations] will receive reparation in a manner consistent with inter-American standards.” Thus, it requested that, “once the receipt of certain compensatory amounts by some of the victims [under the PNR] has been proved, [the Court] take them into account when ordering compensation so that they can be subtracted from the final amount ordered […] for the victims who are in the same situation.” 299. Regarding the list forwarded by the State of 102 persons or family units to whom reparations have presumably been awarded already under the PNR (infra para. 300), the representatives indicated that: (a) some of the individuals mentioned are not victims of the Río Negro massacres and were not individualized as presumed victims in this case; (b) others are victims and have already received a certain amount as compensation, and (c) others are victims but have not received any compensation as yet. The representatives also indicated that the National Reparations Program only awards reparations to some categories of victims; for example, it does not offer reparations to victims of violations of the rights to judicial protection and guarantees; and the program stipulates “that the maximum amount granted to each family unit will be of Q44,000.00, irrespective of the number of victims in the family, and this amount must therefore be divided among the different beneficiaries […].” They also stated that reparations “of an individual and financial nature” could not be considered “integral” reparation. 300. The Court observes, first, that the State has expressed its willingness to provide financial reparations to the victims of this case in keeping with the reparation items of the National Reparations Program. In addition, the State had forwarded with its answering brief a list of 102 people or family units who have apparently received financial reparations under the PNR and a copy of the pertinent administrative case files. For their part, the representatives recognized that some of the individuals on this list are victims in the instant 364 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 77, para. 84, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, supra, para. 318. 101