Court finds it pertinent to indicate that this is not the first case against Guatemala in which human rights violations are alleged that took place during the internal armed conflict. This Court has already had numerous opportunities to rule on the general context of this conflict.31 Hence, in this section, the Court will only refer to the facts that are the most relevant for this case. A) General context 56. Both the Inter-American Court32 and reports from domestic agencies in Guatemala33 have established that, from 1962 to 1996, an internal armed conflict took place in Guatemala that resulted in enormous human, material, institutional and moral costs.34 The Historical Clarification Commission (hereinafter “CEH”) estimated that “more than 200,000 persons died or disappeared during the internal armed conflict,”35 and that the State’s armed forces together with paramilitary groups were responsible for 93% of the human rights violations committed, including 92% of the forced disappearances.36 57. During this conflict, the State applied the so-called “National Security Doctrine,” increasing the intervention of military forces to confront the “subversion, a concept that included every individual or organization that represented any type of opposition to the State; thus, this concept was equal to that of “internal enemy.”37 The CEH concluded that, in application of this doctrine, 91% of recorded violations occurred from 1978 to 1983 under the dictatorships of Generals Romeo Lucas García (1978-1982) and José Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983).38 During those years, military operations consisting mainly in the slaughter of 31 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of April 29, 2004. Series C No. 105; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala, supra; Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, supra, and Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010. Series C No. 212. 32 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Merits, supra, paras. 42.1 to 42.11; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala, supra, paras. 48 to 51; Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, supra, paras. 70 to 73, and Case of Chitay Nech v. Guatemala, supra, paras. 64 to 69. 33 Report of the Historical Clarification Commission, “Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio,” Guatemala, United Nations Office for Project Services, 1999. Available at: http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/gmds_pdf/ (last visit: August 4, 2012), and Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala (ODHAG), “Guatemala Nunca Más”, Report of the Inter-diocese Project “Recovery of the Historical Memory.” Available at: http://www.fundacionpdh.org/lesahumanidad/Reports/guatemala/ReportREMHI-Tome1.htm (last visit: August 4, 2012). 34 Cf. Report “Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio,” supra; Report “Guatemala Nunca Más,” supra; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala, supra, para. 48; Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Merits, supra, para. 42.1; Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, supra, para. 70, and Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 64. 35 Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, supra, para. 70; Report “Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio”, supra, second chapter, volume II, para. 1729. 36 Cf. Report “Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio”, supra, second chapter, volume II, paras. 1754, and 2053 to 2057. 37 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Merits, supra, para. 42.2; Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 64, and Report “Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio”, supra, first chapter, volume I, para. 357. 38 On March 23, 1982, as a result of a coup d’état, a Military Government Junta was installed in Guatemala presided by José Efraín Ríos Montt and also composed of Horacio Egberto Maldonado Schaad and Francisco Luis Gordillo Martínez. On June 8, 1982, José Efraín Ríos Montt assumed the functions of President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, remaining as President until August 31, 1983. In April 1982, the Military Government Junta issued the “National Security and Development Plan,” which established national military, administrative, legal, social, economic and political objectives. The Plan identified the main areas of conflict. Cf. 23