imprisonment. The judgment cited the official notice PRIZON-JUZ-335-0 of June 14, 1994, and a certified copy of the decision issued in the summary inquiry of June 13, 1994 as background to the case; it then provided a description of the facts; it mentioned some of the orders issued in the criminal proceedings; it cited the regulations of the crimes for which the defendants had been summoned, and made a brief reference to their statements. With regard to Mr. Grijalva, it indicated that in his statement he made “various assertions about the facts under investigation, without having bothered to prove them in the present proceedings, in order to exclude or attenuate his responsibility.” It further indicated that once the indictment of the Public Prosecutor's Office had been forwarded, and the defense counsel of the defendants had answered it, the case was received for examination of the evidence for ten days, as provided for in Article 75 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure, during which time “no evidence was presented.” 118. In the instant case, it has been corroborated that the judgment lacks reasoning on factual or legal aspects. In addition, there was no enunciation of the evidence, nor was there any evaluation of the testimonial, documentary, technical or other means of proof admitted or not admitted in the trial; that is to say, there was no analysis of the relevant evidence for and against. In this sense, the evidence was not articulated and the reasons why several exculpatory elements should not be taken into account were not explained. As for the assertion made in the judgment that the alleged victim “did not bother to demonstrate them (the exculpatory elements) in the present proceedings, in order to exclude or mitigate his responsibility,” it is clear that this is contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence. 119. It should be noted that the Court has already pointed out that the burden of proof rests on the State organ, which has the duty to prove the hypothesis of the accusation and criminal liability; therefore, the accused is not required to prove his innocence or to provide exculpatory evidence.107 120. The Court finds that the judgment in the instant case lacks a proper justification or reasoning, an analysis of the facts and the law, and an assessment of the evidence that allowed the judge to establish the criminal liability of the accused and issue the final conviction. The judgment does not show the reasons why the judge considered that the facts attributed to Mr. Grijalva Bueno were subsumed in the criminal norms applied. That is to say, it contains no reasoning whatsoever regarding the legal considerations on the criminal nature of the offense, its relationship to the evidence and its assessment.108 121. Therefore, in relation to the judge’s assessment of the exculpatory evidence referring to: i) two Naval Messages which stated that there were no merits to continue with the investigation; ii) the judicial statement of one of the persons who participated in the preparation of the report of the General Inspectorate of the Navy, admitting that the allegations established by SERINT were not verified, and iii) the statement of a civilian who admitted that he was given money in exchange for accusing Mr. Grijalva Bueno of committing unlawful acts, given the lack of reasoning in the judgment, it is not possible to determine whether the judge assessed that evidence and, if so, why he did not take it into account when he issued the conviction, all this in violation of the principle of presumption of innocence. Cf. Case of Zegarra Marín v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, para. 140. Cf. Case of Norín Catrimán et al. v. Chile (Leaders, Members and Activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 29, 2014, para. 278, and Case of Zegarra Marín v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 153. 107 108 31