c) the reports used for Mr. Grijalva’s dismissal involved a military agent whom the alleged victim had denounced months earlier for having committed serious human rights violations, as well as other authorities denounced by him, who were part of the Council of Senior Officers that ordered his dismissal, since they had a direct interest in the outcome of the investigation because they were involved in the dispute, as the State acknowledged; d) the TGC (Court of Constitutional Guarantees) ordered Mr. Grijalva’s reinstatement (in the Navy) and the restoration of his rights. The Ministry of Defense disagreed with that decision, stating that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces did not commit unconstitutional or illegal acts and requesting the suspension of the TGC’s decision until the military justice system issued a definitive ruling. This request was rejected, and the TGC asserted that “to accept that a criminal prosecution could suspend compliance with a decision of the Tribunal would be to violate the principle of constitutionality of the presumption of innocence;” e) based on the reports used in the administrative process of dismissal, the order to commence proceedings was issued in June 1994 against Mr. Grijalva and another defendant, seven months after the Commander General of the Navy ordered (on November 19, 1993) the start of military criminal proceedings against him and ten other persons, and f) in 1994, Mr. Grijalva publicly denounced in the media the serious human rights violations committed by members of the armed forces. 158. The Court notes that the allegations made by Mr. Grijalva and the various actions taken by the State in the administrative dismissal process and in the military criminal proceedings coincide in time. Both processes were initiated shortly after the alleged victim made allegations of military involvement in serious human rights violations. Thus, an arbitrary administrative process was opened which, as recognized by the State, resulted in Mr. Grijalva’s dismissal. In addition, based on the same arguments, military criminal proceedings were instituted, in which the judicial guarantees were similarly violated, resulting in a conviction against the alleged victim. The proceedings were marred by various irregularities that violated Mr. Grijalva’s procedural guarantees, including the use of reports containing the testimonies of officers who were allegedly coerced or tortured so that they would testify against Mr. Grijalva. This shows that there was a desire to retaliate against the alleged victim and the intent to silence him for having denounced serious human rights violations by members of the institution to which he belonged in order to safeguard it. The corporate response of the military institution was to exclude Mr. Grijalva from its ranks. 159. The Court also considers that, given the serious nature of the human rights violations denounced by Mr. Grijalva Bueno in the performance of his duties as a naval officer and as a public official, he was exercising his freedom of expression. Therefore, this Court considers that the unlawful acts committed by the military authorities and denounced by Mr. Grijalva, both in the institutional sphere and publicly, as well as the fact that the violations of judicial guarantees during the dismissal process were transferred to the military criminal proceedings, could have had an intimidating or inhibiting effect on the free and full exercise of his freedom of expression. At the same time, they could have had an intimidating effect with regard to denunciations of human rights violations by other members of the armed forces which, in turn, would have affected the social dimension of the right to freedom of expression. Consequently, the Court considers that the State violated Article 13(1) of the American Convention to the detriment of Mr. Grijalva Bueno. 41