appropriate procedural opportunity. 16 Legal certainty demands, as a general rule, that all the presumed victims are duly identified in the Merits Report, and it is not possible to add new presumed victims subsequently, except in the exceptional circumstance established in Article 35(2) 17 The Court notes that this case does not involve one of the of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. presumptions of the said Article 35(2) that could justify the identification of presumed victims following the Merits Report. 24. In this regard, the Court emphasizes that the representatives must indicate all the presumed victims during the proceedings before the Commission and refrain from doing this following the issue of the Merits Report referred to in Article 50 of the Convention, 18 as in the instant case. The reasons for this is because, when issuing the said report, the Commission must have all the necessary information to determine the legal and factual issues of the case, including the identity of 19 those who should be considered victims, and this did not occur in the instant case. 25. Consequently, in application of Article 35(1) of its Rules of Procedure and its consistent case law, the Court declares that it will only consider Ms. J. as the presumed victim and eventual beneficiary of any reparations that may be decided, as she was the only person identified as such in the Merits Report of the Commission. B) On the factual framework of this case 26. In her motions and arguments brief, the representative included facts relating to the “international recognition of ‘J.’ as a human rights defender,” and supposed acts of “harassment” against the presumed victim owing to her work of defending other cases before the Court, which were not included by the Commission in its Merits Report. Also, the State argued that the refugee status accorded to Ms. J. and the 2008 extradition procedure against her “do not form part of the facts that are the object of this [case].” 27. This Court recalls that the factual framework of the proceedings before it is constituted by the facts contained in the Merits Report submitted to its consideration. Consequently, it is not admissible for the parties to alleged new facts that differ from those contained in the said report, even though they may describe those that may explain, clarify or reject the facts mentioned in the 20 report and that have been submitted to the Court’s consideration. The exception to this principle are facts characterized as supervening, provided that the latter are related to the facts of the proceedings. The Court notes that the said acts of harassment described by the representative do not constitute facts that explain, clarify or reject the facts included in the Merits Report. Accordingly, the Court will not take them into account in its decision in this case. 16 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148, para. 98, and Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, supra, para. 27. 17 Mutatis mutandi, under the Court’s previous Rules of Procedure, Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2009. Series C No. 209, para. 110, and Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti. Merits and reparations. Judgment of November 23, 2011. Series C No. 236, para. 21. 18 Cf. Case of García and family members v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 29, 2012. Series C No. 258, para. 35. 19 Cf. Case of García and family members v. Guatemala, supra, para. 35. 20 Cf. Case of Five Pensioners v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 153, and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 18. 10