of any kind (supra para. 347). In addition, this Court notes that Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará specifically obliges the States parties, as of its entry into force for each particular State, to use due diligence to prevent, punish and eliminate violence against women. Thus, when an act of violence is committed against a woman, it is particularly important that the authorities in charge of the investigation conduct it with determination and effectiveness, taking into account society’s duty to reject violence against women and the obligation of the State to eliminate it and give the victims confidence in the State institutions created to protect them. 506 Consequently, States must ensure that their domestic laws do not impose differentiated conditions for the investigation of attacks on personal integrity of a sexual nature. In this regard, the Court notes that, under the laws currently in force in Peru, the investigation of offenses against sexual liberty can be opened ex officio. 507 351. The third justification asserted by the State for not opening an investigation was that the presumed victim did not report the facts on occasions other than those described above. In this regard, the Court notes that it is not necessary for the presumed victim to report the facts more than once for the obligation to investigate to arise. Moreover, in cases of alleged sexual violence, the investigation should try insofar as possible to avoid the possible revictimization or reliving of the traumatic experience each time that the victim recalls or makes a statement about what happened. 508 Therefore, it is not reasonable to require victims of sexual violence to repeat the said ill-treatment of a sexual nature in each of their statements or each time that they address the authorities. Furthermore, the Court reiterates that, in the specific case of Ms. J., she reported the said ill-treatment on the two occasions she was granted to make a statement before the authorities: the police statement and her preliminary statement. 352. The fourth and last justification provided by the State is that, “it has been usual that those prosecuted for terrorism allege unduly that they have been victims of rape or other acts of a sexual nature, even though these assertions are not corroborated by the forensic medicine examinations performed, and their only purpose is to contest the legality of the criminal proceedings.” 509 The Court observes that this argument reveals a notion that (i) automatically assumes that complaints of sexual violence are false, contrary to the obligation to open an investigation ex officio each time that a complaint is made or there are indications that this has occurred (supra paras. 341, 342 and 345); (ii) it is contrary to the context of sexual violence that existed at the time of the facts (supra paras. 315 to 317); (iii) it ignores the fact that not all cases of sexual violation and/or rape cause physical injuries that can be verified by a medical examination (supra para. 329), and (iv) it reveals a discretional and discriminatory standard, based on the procedural situation of the women, in order not to open an investigation into an alleged rape or sexual violence. In this regard, the Court recalls that the investigation that the State should open, once the State authorities are aware of the act, must be serious, impartial and effective (supra para. 342). Therefore, the initiation of the investigation cannot be conditioned by the person filing the complaint or by the belief of the authorities, before opening the investigation, that the allegations made are false. 353. In summary, this Court considers that, in this case, the State should have opened an investigation following the first complaint made by Ms. J. on April 21, 1992. The failure to investigate prevents the State from presenting a satisfactory and convincing explanation of the ill506 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 193, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 177. 507 Cf. Law 27,115, which establishes the public criminal action for offenses against sexual liberty (file of annexes to the State’s brief of June 24, 2013, annex 8, folios 4323 and 4324), and 1941 Code of Criminal Procedures, article 302 (file of annexes to the State’s brief of August 14, 2013, folio 5159). 508 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 196, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 180. 509 The State’s answering brief (merits file, folio 498). 105