incommunicado is an exceptional measure to safeguard the results of an investigation, and can only be applied if it is ordered in accordance with conditions previously established by law. 541 The Court considers that the incommunicado to which Ms. J. was subjected in this case was not in keeping with the exceptional nature of this type of detention, especially considering that domestic law only allowed 10 days of incommunicado and following judicial authorization, and it has not been proved that this procedure was followed in this case. Consequently, the State violated Article 5(1), in relation to Article 1(1) of the Convention, to the detriment of Ms. J. E) Other alleged violations of personal integrity 379. The Commission also indicated that “the State violated the right recognized in Article 5(4) of the Convention,” because “during the time that [Ms. J.] was deprived of liberty in the Castro Castro Prison, she was kept with persons who had been convicted.” For its part, the State indicated that this argument could not be examined in the instant case, because it had already been decided by the Court supra (paras. 29 to 31). 380. This Court has considered that Article 5(4) 542 of the American Convention imposes on States the obligation to establish a system for classifying prison inmates, in order to ensure that those who are being prosecuted are segregated from those who have been convicted, and that the former are treated in a way that is appropriate to their status as persons who have not been convicted. 543 These guarantees may be understood as a corollary to the right of a person who is being prosecuted to the presumption of innocence until his or her guilt has been established legally, which is recognized in Article 8(2) of the Convention. The State must prove the existence and operation of a classification system that respects the guarantees established in Article 5(4) of the Convention, as well as the existence of exceptional circumstances if it does not separate persons being prosecuted from persons who have been convicted. 544 The Court has also established that the segregation of those prosecuted from those convicted requires not only that they are kept in different cells, but also that those cells are located in different sections within each detention center, or in different establishments if possible. 545 381. In this case, it has not been proved that there was a classification system for prisoners that segregated those being prosecuted from those who had already been convicted in the Miguel Castro Castro Prison. To the contrary, the State improvised a single system for consolidating prisoners, without implementing adequate regimes for inmates accused of, and convicted for, offenses of terrorism and treason. 546 Therefore, the Court finds it proved that, while Ms. J. was detained in the Miguel Castro Castro Prison, she was not segregated from the prisoners who had been convicted as Article 5(4) of the Convention requires. In this regard, the State did not cite the existence of exceptional circumstances to justify the temporary failure to separate those being prosecuted from those who had been convicted. Consequently, the State violated Article 5(4) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument. 382. The representative also argued that the detention in Germany had a “re-traumatizing” effect on J. In this regard, she indicated that this detention was carried out at the request of the Peruvian 541 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 89. 542 Article 5(4) of the American Convention stipulates that: “[a]ccused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons.” 543 Cf. Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, supra, para. 158, and Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, supra, para. 146. 544 Cf. Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, supra, para. 146. 545 Cf. Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, supra, para. 147. 546 Cf. Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, volume VII, chapter 2.68, p. 769, and Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 197.10. 113