that the fact that State agents refer to J. as a terrorist “violates the principle of the presumption of innocence, because no court has found her guilty of terrorism.” 232. The State argued that the presumption of innocence of Ms. J. has been respected in the criminal proceedings against her, in which she has not been convicted either “formally or informally,” because “the procedural ruling to keep the proceedings open was issued under the counter-terrorism laws that had been adapted to the judgments of the Inter-American Court.” It also argued that “the evidence gathered in these criminal proceedings was not illegal […], because most of it was sought and gathered first by the National Police of Peru and, subsequently, by ordinary prosecutors and judges,” and “it was obtained fully respecting human rights.” In addition, the State argued that “[t]he specific regime of exclusion of evidence adopted by the courts of justice of each country […] is not a matter that can be decided under the rules of the American Convention.” According to Peru, “the presumed violations of due process that were committed do not constitute grounds for excluding material gathered previously; likewise, the nullity of a proceeding does not immediately cause an absolute prohibition to re-use the evidence that was gathered to open it.” Regarding the statements mades by State officials concerning Ms. J., the State argued that the newspaper articles did not necessarily repeat the literal meaning of the statements of the officials. In addition, it indicated that “none of the officials referred to in the newspaper articles is a jurisdictional authority.” In addition, it asserted that the Court should weigh the context in which the statements were made because this was shortly after J. had received an award relating to international justice, which sparked an outcry in the national media, since the charges against her were public knowledge. In this regard, the State denied that its officials had issued statements that went beyond explaining to the public the procedural situation of Ms. J., who had been accused of belonging to the Shining Path terrorist group. ii. Considerations of the Court 233. The Inter-American Court has indicated that, in the sphere of criminal justice, the principle of the presumption of innocence constitutes a cornerstone of the judicial guarantees. 341 The presumption of innocence means that the accused does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense attributed to him, because the onus probandi corresponds to the accuser, 342 and any doubt must be used to benefit the accused. Thus, the irrefutable proof of guilt constitutes an essential requirement for imposing criminal punishment; hence, the burden of proof lies with the accuser and not with the accused. 343 In addition, the principle of the presumption of innocence signifies that the judges must not open the proceedings with a preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offense of which he is accused. 344 234. The Court recalls that, previously, it concluded that the arbitrary nature of the order of preventive detention against Ms. J., as well as the failure to provide the reasoning for the ruling of the “faceless” Supreme Court of December 27, 1993, violated the presumption of her innocence (supra paras. 168 and 229). However, in this section, the Court will examine the violation of this right owing to other facts and circumstances alleged by the Commission and the representative, namely: (a) various statements by State officials concerning J.’s guilt, and (b) that the second stage of the proceedings against Ms. J. was based on evidence that was allegedly illegally obtained. 341 128. Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 77, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 342 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 154, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 128. 343 The Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has ruled similarly. Human Rights Committee. General comment No. 32, Right to equality before courts ad tribunals and to a fair trial (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (vol. I)), para. 30. 344 Cf. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 184, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 128. 69