However, the Court takes note of the State’s argument according to which Ms. J. is being charged with the concurrent (concurso ideal) offenses of apology of terrorism and membership in a terrorist organization, and in these circumstances the offense of apology of terrorism has not prescribed. In this regard, witness Pablo Talavera indicated that this is a matter that the prosecutor and judges of 413 Based on the information provided, the Court does not have the specific case must elucidate. evidence allowing it to conclude that the said offense has prescribed, so that the prosecution of Ms. J. for the said offense would constitute a violation of her right to be tried with due guarantees. Nevertheless, the Court considers that the prescription of the action is a defense that Ms. J. could present at the opportune procedural moment in the current criminal proceedings, and this has not occurred to date. 297. Also, regarding the sources of evidence that are the basis for the current proceedings, this Court reiterates that it is not incumbent on it to rule on the presumed violation of Article 8 of the Convention in relation to the presentation and assessment of the evidence in the actual criminal proceedings against the presumed victim because, during these proceedings, she will be able to contest the sources of evidence that substantiate the charges, which she has not done to date (supra para. 113). IX RIGHT TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND PRIVACY IN RELATION TO THE OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT AND ENSURE THE RIGHTS 298. In this chapter the Court will examine the alleged violations of the right to personal integrity and privacy of Ms. J., due to the alleged ill-treatment suffered by the presumed victim at the time of her initial arrest and during her detention in the DINCOTE, as well as the alleged failure to separate Ms. J. from inmates who had been convicted during her detention in the Miguel Castro Castro Prison. A) General arguments of the Commission and of the parties 299. The Commission indicated that Ms. J. was “[t]ortured by rape and another series of abuses and acts contrary to her personal integrity and dignity by [DINCOTE] officials,” and also “subjected to incommunicado [and] inhuman detention conditions.” It stated that “in cases such as this one, the victim has no means of proving the acts of violence against her. It is for the State, through its pertinent investigative authorities to disprove the complaints of abuse and violence by its agents.” The Commission stressed that “in the case of Ms. J., the difficulty in obtaining evidence can be verified due not only to the nature of the acts described, but also to the whole institutional structure that, at the time, had been erected as an obstacle to obtaining evidence of acts of this nature.” 300. The representative argued that the acts of violence, including the presumed rape, constituted torture. She indicated that the State had the burden of proof in this case, and that the latter “not only […] has not refuted any of the complaints with evidence […], but is also responsible up until the present day for having disregarded these complaints, for not having investigated the said torture, merely limiting itself to denying it.” Regarding the medical examination that was performed, she indicated that it lasted five minutes and that certain forms of torture may leave no physical traces 301. The State argued that “from the start, the DINCOTE intervention was legitimated by the participation of representatives of the Public Prosecution Service and, during the subsequent actions, with the presence of her defense counsel, ruling out the possibility that acts of violence, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been perpetrated during her transfer and the time 413 Cf. Affidavit prepared by witness Pablo Rogelio Talavera Elguera on May 6, 2013 (merits report, folio 1086). 87