7 25. Separately, the Court notes that the State rejected its responsibility for the alleged violation of Article 21, in relation to the obligation established in Article 1(1) of the American Convention. For this reason, the Court finds that a legal dispute still exists over that alleged violation. 26. The Court finds that the admission of the facts and the acquiescence with regard to the violation of Article 25(1) of the American Convention constitutes a positive contribution to this process, to the effectiveness of the principles that inspire the American Convention,13 and to the conduct to which States are obliged on this issue by virtue of the commitments that they assume as parties to international human rights instruments. Likewise and as in other cases,14 the Court finds that the State’s acknowledgment made in the proceeding before the Commission and repeated before the Court has full juridical effect in accordance with Articles 62 and 64 of the Court Rules of Procedure. 27. Nevertheless, the Court finds it necessary to specify the scope of the acknowledgment and to resolve the disputes that exist between the parties. Consequently, taking into account the attributes that are required to ensure the greatest protection of human rights, the Court finds it necessary to deliver a judgment in which it establishes the facts and determines the merits of the case, as well as their corresponding consequences.15 V PRIOR CONSIDERATION REGARDING SOME VICTIMS’ ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXHAUST DOMESTIC REMEDIES 28. In its answer to the application, the State indicated that it wished to “put on the record its disagreement and unease with a procedural aspect of the [Inter-American Commission’s] ruling on the admissibility of this case. This is due to the fact that the State considers that in its report on admissibility, the [Commission] had to divide the ‘petitioners’ into two groups: a) the first group comprising 185 workers who exhausted domestic remedies; and b) the second comprising 48 workers who did not comply with that requirement, as they voluntarily abstained from requesting the corresponding remedies to challenge the ruling against their demands even when the option to do so was completely open to them.” In this sense, the State “specif[ied] that when it presented its Admissibility and Merits Report No. 08/09, the [Commission] did not act with the diligence necessary to demand that the alleged victims comply with the admissibility requirements or to interpret and weigh the existence or lack of one of the exceptions to the general rule of prior exhaustion of domestic measures.” Thus it indicated that: a) [...] the alleged victims at all times had access to the specialized jurisdiction courts, and domestic appeal remedies were freely available. At the time, they decided not to use those remedies. In contrast to the actions of these individuals, the petitioners in the case from the first group were able to access the remedies up to the final instance, which was exhausted upon the issuing of a final ruling with the character of res judicata. Thus the Peruvian State 13 Cf. Case of Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia. Merits. Judgment of January 26, 2000. Series C No. 64, para. 42; Case of Rosendo Cantú and otra V. México. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2010 Serie C No. 216, para. 25, and Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra note 12, para. 37 14 Cf. Case of Acevedo-Jaramillo et al. v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, paras. 176 to 180; Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 21, and Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra note 15, paras. 23 to 25. 15 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre,” supra note 29, para. 69; Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 11, para. 18, Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra 12, para. 30, and Case of Vélez Loor, supra note 12, para. 70.