supposed denial of justice in light of the alleged violation of the rights recognized in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, regarding which the Court does have competence.” 18 34. As indicated, Chile declared that it accepted the competence of the Court with regard to “facts subsequent to [August 21, 1990,] or, in any case, to facts that began to be executed after March 11, 1990.” Consequently, the cases cited in the preceding paragraph are similar to this one in relation to the existence of the temporal limitations to the competence of the Court, and because the pertinent acts are not of a continuing or permanent nature. 35. In view of the above, the Court will examine whether the facts that occurred after Chile’s acceptance of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction are independent facts that could constitute autonomous violations. 19 As regards the “political imprisonment,” torture and exile suffered by Mr. García Lucero, there is no dispute between the parties and the Commission that these took place between 1973 and 1975, prior to the entry into force for the State of the obligations set out in the treaties that are alleged to have been violated (supra para. 16). The Court will only consider these facts as background information; in other words, as useful information to understand the context of this case and the facts to be examined within the temporal competence of the Court. 36. However, when filing this preliminary objection, Chile argued that the “actual grounds for the right to reparation” that it is affirmed has been violated “originated” in events that occurred prior to the ratification of the American Convention. Nevertheless, with regard to torture, based on the Court’s case law, it must be indicated that “[e]ach act of torture is executed or completed in the act, and its execution does not extend over time, so that an act or acts of torture [are] instantaneous crimes. Moreover, the aftereffects of torture […] do not constitute a continuing crime.” 20 The “political imprisonment” and exile, as well as their aftereffects and consequences, fall outside the Court’s competence, because they originated or began to be executed before March 11, 1990. 37. Based on the foregoing, and owing to their relationship to acts that occurred before 1990, or to the consequences of those acts, this Court will not rule on the following points: the damage derived from the “political imprisonment,” torture, and exile of Mr. García Lucero, in relation to either Mr. García Lucero himself or to his family members, or the measures of reparation that might be satisfactory based on these facts. 21 Thus the integral nature or individualization of the reparation can only be evaluated based on an examination of the facts that gave rise to the harm and their effects, and they are excluded from the Court’s temporal competence. 38. Following Chile’s acceptance of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, on receiving the Commission’s communication of December 23, 1993 (infra para. 75), the State learned that acts of “political imprisonment” and torture had been committed against Mr. García Lucero, and found that he had been a victim of these acts. The Court is unable to analyze these facts per se, or their effects, or the measures of reparation awarded in this regard. 18 Cf. Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra, paras. 35, 38 and 39. 19 Cf. Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, supra, para. 84, and Case of the Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, supra, para. 47. 20 Case of Alfonso Martin del Campo Dodd v. Mexico. Preliminary objections. Judgment of September 3, 2004. Series C No. 113, para. 78. 21 Such as the measures allegedly needed and that refer to medical or psychological/psychiatric treatment, and to Mr. García Lucero’s permanent disability. 13