However, it is able to examine whether, based on autonomous facts that occurred within its temporal competence, the State complied with its obligation to investigate and whether it provided the appropriate remedies to file claims concerning measures of reparation, pursuant to the American Convention, and also the Inter-American Convention against Torture. In this regard, Article 8 of the Inter-American Convention against Torture expressly indicates the obligation of States “to proceed ex officio and immediately to conduct an investigation” when “there is an accusation or well-grounded reason to believe that an act of torture has been committed within their jurisdiction.” Thus, the Court has ruled in cases related to the failure to investigate possible acts of torture that occurred outside the Court’s temporal competence based on the knowledge that State authorities had of those acts after the acceptance of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. 22 39. Consequently, the Court has competence to examine, in light of the right to judicial guarantees and judicial protection established in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention, in relation to the obligations established in Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument and of the obligations derived from Articles 1, 6, 8 and 9 of the Inter-American Convention against Torture, as appropriate, the acts or omissions characterized as autonomous facts that occurred when the Court acquired temporal competence. In other words, when examining the merits of the case, it will analyze whether the State guaranteed access to justice 23 in relation to the investigation of the facts, as well as in relation to the existence of remedies to file claims concerning measures of reparation. 40. Furthermore, as indicated in the judgment in the case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, the Court is competent to examine the arguments related to the alleged failure to comply with international obligations related to the continued existence of Decree Law No. 2,191 (on amnesty). 24 41. Lastly, taking into account the above-mentioned characteristics of the instant case as regards its relationship to alleged violations based on supposed acts and omissions 22 Cf. Case of Ticona Estrada et al. v. Bolivia. Merits reparations and costs. Judgment of November 27, 2008. Series C No. 191, paras. 93 to 97. 23 In this regard, the findings of the Court in the case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador should be recalled: “Since the Court lacks competence to examine the facts or acts prior to or that began to be executed before June 6, 1995, […] the substantial aspect of the dispute in this case before Court is not whether the Serrano Cruz sisters were disappeared by the State, but whether the domestic proceedings guaranteed access to justice in keeping with the standards established in the American Convention.” In addition, in this judgment, the Court also recalled that, in its judgment of November 23, 2004, on preliminary objections in this case, it “decided that it [was] not competent to examine the facts or acts that occurred before June 6, 1995, the date on which the State [���] accepted the competence of the Court, and nor was it competent to examine the facts or acts that began to be executed prior to June 6, 1995, and that continued after that date.” Furthermore, it decided that it “had competence to examine ‘the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, and any other violation the facts or start of execution of which were subsequent’ to the date on which the State accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. […] Therefore, the Court decided that it would not rule on the supposed forced disappearance of Ernestina and Erlinda Serrano Cruz that allegedly took place in June 1982 and, consequently, on any of the arguments that supported violations related to this disappearance” (Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Merits reparations and costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120, paras. 55 and 26, respectively). This Court notes that the said case is analogous to the instant case, because, even though it refers to acts of forced disappearance, in that case the Court did not have competence to refer to acts that “began to be executed” prior to the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction; in other words, it was not the permanent or continuing nature of forced disappearance that prompted the said affirmation by the Court. 24 In paragraph 50 of that judgment, the Court indicated: “Regarding the continued existence of Decree Law No. 2,191, it cannot be argued that the start of execution of the supposed failure to comply with Article 2 of the American Convention occurred with the promulgation of this law in 1978 and that, consequently, the Court does not have competence to examine that fact. The start of execution of the supposed failure to comply with Article 2 of the American Convention occurred when the State undertook to adapt its domestic legislation to the Convention; that is, when it ratified the Convention.” Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra, paras. 49 and 50. 14