So, in short, your Excellency, I would like to thank you for allowing me to speak. I reiterate that the State acknowledges its responsibility and is willing to make any reparation arrangement. Lastly, I would like to add a thought. The petitioners accuse us of being the “villains” … I recall that Mr. Cisneros said that we are the “villains”…. I don’t see it in that way; I believe there has been suffering that must be redressed. And finally, with regard to ancestral knowledge, I see here before me the indigenous leadership. We should work together to bring charges against the companies that steal ancestral rights from indigenous communities. At some point we should begin a frank discussion, and not allow others to take this knowledge that belong to these communities and make themselves rich from it. At some point we must discuss these issues. Thank you, your Excellency. 24. Following this statement, the President of the Court gave the floor to members of the Sarayaku People, to their representatives in this case, and to the Inter-American Commission, who presented their observations in this regard. Immediately after the meeting, members of the Sarayaku People announced that the community had decided to await the judgment of the Court. 25. On May 15, 2012, after the visit to the territory and the acknowledgement of responsibility, the State indicated that “the public declaration [of the Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Presidency] is, in itself, and in advance, a form of reparation of human rights under the provisions of Article 63(1) of the American Convention,” and asked the Court to “convey this position officially, which will eventually allow the parties to move forward toward specific technical agreements on reparations or aspects of the merits, as appropriate.” The Commission and the representatives did not present any observations in this regard. 26. Under Articles 62 and 64 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure,24 and in exercise of its powers of international judicial protection of human rights, a matter of international public order that transcends the will of the parties, it is the Court’s responsibility to ensure that acts of acquiescence are acceptable for the purposes sought by the inter-American system. This task is not limited to verifying, recording, or taking note of the acknowledgment made by the State, or to verifying the formal conditions of such acts; rather, it must examine them in relation to the nature and seriousness of the alleged violations, the requirements and interests of justice, the particular circumstances of the specific case, and the attitude and position of the parties,25 so that it can elucidate the truth of what took place, to the extent possible, and in the exercise of its jurisdiction.26 27. In the present case, the Court notes that the State made its acknowledgment of responsibility in broad and general terms. Thus, it is for the Court to give full effect to this declaration made by the State and assess it positively, given its far-reaching significance in the context of the inter-American system for the protection of human rights, in particular because it was made on Sarayaku territory during the procedure carried out in this case. Thus, for the Court, this acknowledgment represents an admission of the facts included within the factual framework of the Commission’s application,27 and of the relevant information provided by the representatives to 24 These provisions of the Court’s Rules of Procedure establish the following: “Article 62. Acquiescence: If the respondent informs the Court of its acceptance of the facts or its total or partial acquiescence to the claims stated in the presentation of the case or the brief submitted by the presumed victims or their representatives, the Court shall decide, having heard the opinions of all those participating in the proceedings and at the appropriate procedural moment, whether to accept that acquiescence, and shall rule upon its juridical effects.” “Article 64. Continuation of a Case. Bearing in mind its responsibility to protect human rights, the Court may decide to continue the consideration of a case notwithstanding the existence of the conditions indicated in the preceding Articles.” 25 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 24 and Case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2011. Series C No. 232, para. 25 26 Cf. Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 17 and Case of Contreras et al. v. El Salvador, para. 25. 27 The State has also referred to criminal cases opened against members of the Sarayaku, in relation to alleged acts of violence and the alleged theft of 150 kg of pentolite explosive, for which one of the members of this community was convicted in a criminal court. The State also indicated that “between November 22, 2002, and January 25, 2003, 29 CGC workers were kidnapped.” In addition, it claimed that members of the Sarayaku were obtaining financial benefits from the existence of pentolite explosives on their territory. In this regard, the Court emphasizes once again, what it stated in the first judgment delivered in a contentious case: that it is not a criminal court or a court of first instance that analyzes or determines the criminal, administrative or disciplinary responsibility of individuals (Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. 10