by Sarayaku members that are included in the case file,256 as well as by newspaper articles,257 and a video produced by Sarayaku in 2003.258 192. It is also relevant that, on July 30, 2001, the Ministry of Defense signed a military cooperation agreement with the oil companies operating in the country, whereby the State undertook “to guarantee the security of the oil facilities, as well as of the persons working there” (supra para. 78). In this regard, the State itself presented, as an attachment to its answering brief, a letter from the CGC to PETROECUADOR dated December 16, 2002, in which its representative asked the State to anticipate “the security necessary for the oil operations, by urgently calling for the intervention of the National Police and the Armed Forces.”259 In a similar letter, dated November 25, 2002, the same CGC representative asked the State, given the Sarayaku opposition, to “take all the necessary measures it considers appropriate, so that, in conjunction with the armed forces, the implementation of the seismic project is facilitated.”260 193. Thus, it is possible to consider that the State supported the oil exploration activities of the CGC by providing security with members of its armed forces at certain times, which did not promote a climate of trust and mutual respect in order to reach a consensus between the parties. 194. In addition, the company’s actions, by attempting to legitimate its oil exploration activities and justify its intervention in Sarayaku territory, failed to respect the established structures of authority and representation within and outside the communities.261 The CGC merely offered money and different economic benefits to the Sarayaku People (as it did to other communities in the area, supra paras. 73 to 75, 82 and 84) in order to obtain their consent to carry out activities to explore for and exploit the natural resources on their territory, without the State undertaking or monitoring a systematic and flexible process of participation and dialogue with them. It was also alleged, and was not contested by the State, that the CGC had used fraudulent procedures to obtain signatures of support from members of the Sarayaku Community (supra para. 73). 195. In fact, on April 10, 2003, the Ombudsman’s Office of the province of Pastaza declared that, in this case, it had been “fully” proved that the constitutional right established in article 84(5) of the Constitution of Ecuador had been violated, together with ILO Convention No. 169 and Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Furthermore, it found that the Ministry of Energy and Mines and the chairman of the board of PETROECUADOR were responsible for these violations, and also the legal representative of the CGC (supra para. 110). 196. For its part, on May 8, 2003, after visiting the Sarayaku People, the Human Rights Committee of the National Congress issued a report in which it concluded that “[t]he State, through the Ministries of the Environment and of Energy and Mines, has violated clause 5) of article 84 of the 256 Cf. Photographs (evidence file, tome 11, folios 6575 and 6576), and video produced by the Sarayaku for the exclusive use of the Commission and the Court. 257 Evidence file, tome 11, folios 6550 and ff. 258 The video shows statements made to the press by the then Minister of Mines and Energy, retired Colonel Carlos Arboleda, in which, in October 2003, he declared that “the work of CGC will be protected because this is a State’s policy” and, in response to the journalists’ questions regarding the military presence in the area, he indicated that “the State must use all the State’s forces to protect the security of the companies that wish to work in Ecuador.” The video shows members of the Army using the helicopters hired by the CGC. This was not specifically contested by the State. (Video produced by the Sarayaku for the exclusive use of the Commission and the Court. Attachment sent by the petitioners with the communication of March 15, 2004, included in the file before the Court). 259 Evidence file, tome 14, folio 8647. 260 Cf. Note DM-DINAPA-CSA-870 of December 24, 2002, of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, referring to the CGC letter of November 25, 2002 (evidence file, tome 9, folio 4958 and ff.). 261 “As will be seen below, the corporation cultivated relations with select communities that supported oil activity through patronage and promises. This selective corporate-indigenous engagement led to strident disagreement among indigenous communities as to who had authority to dictate what would happen within indigenous territory. Because broad consultation never occurred the intimate relations that the Kichwa maintain with their sentient rain forest were placed under threat […] and fully informed consultation and consent among equals would necessarily diminish the chances of manipulation and encourage the chances of indigenous cohesion.” Expert opinion provided by affidavit by professor Suzana Sawyer, on June 24, 2011 (evidence file, tome 19, folios 10109 and 10119). 55