protection of the life and personal integrity of the said individuals by urgent measures was intended, inter alia, to enable them to provide their testimony without any type of coercion or threat or without suffering any reprisal. This was, at that time, the essential purpose of the urgent measures. 25. Subsequently, when ratifying the urgent measures, the Court took into account that the individuals protected had already given their testimony and some of them had expressed their fear because they had done so. Therefore, in the circumstances of this case, the Court deemed that their situation should still be considered as of extreme gravity and urgency. 26. To determine whether the situation that gave rise to the measures exists or persists, the Court can assess the series of factors or circumstances of a political, historical, cultural or any other nature that affect the beneficiary or place him in a situation of vulnerability at a certain moment and lay him open to the violation of his rights. This situation may increase or decrease over time depending on numerous variables but, as mentioned, only extreme and urgent situations warrant protection by provisional measures.13 27. The Court confirms and emphasizes that the provisional measures have not been sufficiently and adequately implemented by the State since they were ordered. The internal forced displacements have affected the next of kin of the victims and have obstructed the adaptation of the protective measures to the needs of each family group. Nevertheless, the State has not demonstrated that this was sufficient reason for failing to comply with what the Court ordered and, above all, it has not conducted or presented risk assessments of the beneficiaries, despite have undertaken to do so. 28. In the instant case, one of the major obstacles to the implementation of these measures is the absence of sufficient, permanent and adequate communication between the beneficiaries of the measures or their representatives and the State to agree on their implementation and to learn the actual situation of risk faced by the beneficiaries. In this regard, the Court has insisted in this case14 and in others15 on the need for the beneficiaries and their representatives to collaborate to ensure the satisfactory implementation of the provisional measures. 29. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State’s obligation to protect is clear. It is true that the representatives have not provided individualized information on the actual situation of risk of each beneficiary, but neither has the State revealed any domestic procedures or efforts by the different State institutions that possess databases to locate the beneficiaries of these provisional measures and to proceed to 13 Cr. Case of Liliana Ortega, supra note 10, twenty-second considering paragraph; Matters of the Monagas Detention Center (“La Pica”); the Capital Region Penitentiary Center Yare I and Yare II (Yare Prison); the Occidental Region Penitentiary Center (Uribana Prison), and the Capital Detention Center El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II, supra note 8, thirtieth considering paragraph, and Case of Mack Chang et al. Provisional measures with regard to Guatemala. Order of the Inter-American Court of November 16, 2009, twenty-first considering paragraph. 14 Cr. Case of the Mapiripán Massacre. Provisional measures with regard to Colombia. Order of the Inter-American Court of September 2, 2010, twentieth considering paragraph. 15 Cr. Case of the 19 Tradesmen. Provisional measures with regard to Colombia. Order of the InterAmerican Court of July 8, 2009, fortieth and ninety-sixth considering paragraphs; Matter of the Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó Communities. Provisional measures with regard to Colombia. Order of the Inter-American Court of August 30, 2010, fifty-first considering paragraph; Case of Carpio Nicolle. Provisional measures with regard to Guatemala. Order of the Inter-American Court of July 6, 2009, thirty-first considering paragraph. 8