8 b) In relation to the replacement mechanism for the intelligence archives, the State reported that it does not plan to stop saving intelligence and counterintelligence information, since this is a legitimate function of the State. The State wished to convey, however, that it will not save information obtained for discriminatory or political motives, making reference to Articles 18, 19, and 20 of Public Statute No. 1288 of 2009. The State concluded that “gathering information, intelligence, and counterintelligence will continue to take place in compliance with the reigning applicable norms, which in today’s day and age are clear, specific, and have fixed limits in light of the respect owed the human rights of all citizens.” 17. The brief of the Inter-American Commission of March 29, 2010 whereby it indicated that: a) Regarding the threats and harassment received by members of the CCJ within the last six months, these “have been occurring in a context of accusations on the part of State agents, which has served as a catalyst for different incidents of threats, harassment, monitoring, and spying against human rights defenders.” In this regard, the Commission remarked that “during 2009 and the first few months of 2010, human rights defenders in Colombia, including members of the CCJ, continued to face a hostile atmosphere with the authorities and an increase in the persecution they faced in their work safeguarding fundamental rights.” In this respect, the Commission alluded to reports from the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, the UN Committee Against Torture, and the UN’s independent expert on minority issues all referring to the situation of harassment, threats, surveillance, and spying that human rights defenders in Colombia face. In addition, the Commission recalled that in March 2009, a member of the CCJ, Lina Paola Malagón, received threats for her work and was “branded a guerilla,” causing her to have to change her residence and live abroad. The Commission highlighted the petitioners’ assertion that, upon their return to Colombia in January 2010, Ms. Malagón was the target of surveillance from a “public transportation vehicle.” The Commission added that in a document provided by the petitioners, the same petitioners argued that between 2009 and 2010 in the course of criminal proceedings against DAS officials, the CCJ was informed that “other members of this organization have been the target of illicit activities on the part of [a] State security entity, just as was the case with attorney Alejandra Vega Rodríguez”; b) According to information provided by the CCJ, “the majority of evidence of illicit DAS activities as to monitoring and harassment of human rights defenders was clandestinely removed from their own installations.” The CCJ reported to the Commission that this DAS intelligence information was transmitted to paramilitary groups, which – in the Commission’s view – evidenced the “wellfounded fear that the disappeared information is in the hands of paramilitary groups [implying] the continuity and imminent nature of a situation of extreme gravity, urgency, and irreparable harm”; c) “In the last two months, the risk factors related to the trial of cases involving the CCJ are elevated.” This rise is owed to the fact that investigations and trials are all moving forward. Specifically, the Commission referred to the criminal investigation into the then-Vice President of the Republic’s alleged links to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (in Spanish: “Autodefensas Unidas