- 56 legitimate purpose, proportionality.315 and comply with the requirements of suitability, necessity and 169. Previously the Court has never ruled on the right to take part in government, the freedom of expression and the right of assembly of individuals who exercise judicial functions, as in this case. In this regard, it is important to underline that the American Convention guarantees these rights to everyone, irrespective of any other consideration, so that the Convention cannot be considered or restricted for a specific profession or group of persons.316 However, as indicated above, these rights are not absolute, thus they may be subject to restrictions that are compatible with the Convention (supra para. 168). Owing to their functions in the administration of justice, under normal conditions of the rule of law, judges may be subject to different restrictions, and in different ways, that would not affect other individuals, including other public officials. 170. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (hereinafter “the United Nations Basic Principles”) recognize that “members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”317 In addition, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct establish that: “[a] judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, a judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”318 Similarly, the European Court has indicated that certain restrictions to freedom of expression of judges are necessary “in all cases where the authority and impartiality of the Judiciary are likely to be called into question.”319 171. The general purpose of guaranteeing independence and impartiality is, in principle, a legitimate reason for restricting certain rights of judges. Article 8(1) of the American Convention establishes that “[e]very person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal.” Thus, the State is obliged to ensure that its judges and courts comply with these precepts. Therefore, the restriction of certain conduct by judges in order to protect independence and impartiality in the imparting of justice is in keeping with the American Convention, as a “right or freedom of others.” 315 Cf. The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, supra, paras. 35 and 37, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2012. Series C No. 257, para. 273. See also, on the right to freedom of expression: Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 120; Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 29, 2011. Series C No. 238, para. 43, and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 127. And, on political rights: Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua, supra, para. 206; Case of Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, supra, para. 149, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 107. 316 Regarding freedom of expression, see, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), supra, paras. 81 and 84, and Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, para. 114. 317 United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985, principle 8. 318 Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25 and 26, 2002, para. 4.6. 319 Cf. ECHR, Case of Wille v. Liechtenstein [GS], No. 28396/95. Judgment of October 28, 1999, para. 64, and Case of Kudeshkina v. Russia, No. 29492/05. Judgment of February 26, 2009, para. 86.