- 57 172. In this regard, a regional consensus exists concerning the need to restrict the participation of judges in party political activities;320 however, in some States any type of participation in politics is prohibited with the exception of voting in the elections.321 Nevertheless, the power of the State to regulate or restrict these rights is not discretionary and any limitation of the rights recognized in the Convention must be interpreted restrictively.322 The prohibition of judges from participating in activities of a party nature should not be interpreted broadly, in a way that prevents judges from taking part in any discussion of a political nature.323 173. Thus, there may be situation in which a judge, as a citizen who is a member of society, considers that he or she has a moral duty to speak out.324 In this regard, expert witness Leandro Despouy pointed out that it may constitute an obligation for judges to speak out “in a context in which democracy is being impaired, because they are the public officials – specifically the judicial agents �� who are the guardians of the basic rights, in the face of abuses of power by other public officials or other power groups.”325 Furthermore, expert witness Martin Federico Böhmer asserted that, during a coup d’état, judges “are obliged to support and ensure that the population knows that they support the constitutional system.” He also emphasized that “[i]f one can call any opinion nonpartisan, it is the opinion emitted by the citizens of a constitutional democracy when they strongly 320 The Court notes that, in the region, there are different degrees of restriction for judges. In Argentina, judges are prohibited from engaging in activities of political proselytism. In Brazil, they are prohibited from engaging in politics. In Bolivia and Dominican Republic, they are prohibited from activism in a political party. In Chile, they are prohibited from attending meetings, demonstrations or other acts of a political nature; while in El Salvador, judges are prohibited from occupying directorial positions in political parties. Cf. Argentina (Rules of Procedure for the National Judiciary, article 8. Available at: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/165000-169999/167638/norma.htm, and Law 24,937 on the Council of the Judiciary, article 14. Available at: http://www.infojus.gob.ar/legislacion/ley-nacional-24937consejo_magistratura.htm?6.); Brazil (Constitution, article 95. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm); Bolivia (Law on the Judiciary of June 24, 2010, articles 19 and 22. Available at: http://magistratura.organojudicial.gob.bo/ index.php/institucion/2013-05-07-16-03-21/finish/3leyes/1-ley-del-organo-judicial); Dominican Republic (Law No. 327-98 on the Judicial Service, articles 45 and 65. Available at: http://ojd.org.do/Normativas/General/Ley%20No.%20327-98,%20 sobre%20Carrera%20Judicial,%20del%2011%20de%20agosto%20de%201998%20G.O.%209994.pdf); Chile (Organic Code of the Courts, article 323. Available at: http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=25563), and El Salvador (Judicial Service Act of July 12, 1990, articles 26 and 53. Available at: http://www.asamblea.gob.sv/eparlamento/indice-legislativo/buscadorde-documentos-legislativos/ley-de-la-carrera-judicial). 321 Colombia (Statutory Law on the administration of justice of March 15, 1996, article 154. Available at: http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=6548, and Consolidated Disciplinary Code, Available at: http://www.procuraduria.gov.co/relatoria/media/file/Codigo_Disciplinario_Unico_2011.pdf); Costa Rica (Organic Law of the Judiciary of July 1, 1993, articles 9 and 192. Available at https://www.tse.go.cr/pdf/normativa/leyorganicapoderjudicial.pdf); Nicaragua (Judicial Service Act, Articles 43 and 66. Available at: http://www.poderjudicial.gob.ni/carrerajudicial/ ley_de_carrera_judicia_su_normativa.pdf); Panama (Constitution of the Republic of Panama of October 1972, articles 212 and 284. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/2083/CONSTITUTION.pdf); Peru (Constitution of Peru, article 153. Available at: http://www4.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Constitu/Cons1993.pdf, and Judicial Service Act, article 48. Available at: http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_per_ley29277.pdf), and Venezuela (Constitution, article 256. Available at: http://www.mp.gob.ve/LEYES/constitucion/constitucion1.html, and Code of Ethics of the Venezuelan Judge, articles 26, 32 and 33. Available at: http://www.mp.gob.ve/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=949621c5-5d93-436eb0ac17a7312faef6& groupId=10136). 322 The power of States to regulate or restrict rights is not discretionary; rather it is limited by international law, and this requires compliance with specific imperatives, and if these are not respected the restriction is unlawful and contrary to the American Convention. According to Article 29(a) in fine of this treaty, no provision of this instrument may be interpreted as restricting rights to a greater extent than is provided for therein. Cf. Case of Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, supra, para. 174. 323 Similarly, see, ECHR, Wille v. Liechtenstein [GS], No. 28396/95. Judgment of October 28, 1999, para. 67. 324 Cf. United Nations, Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013, paras. 65 and 140. In this regard, the Ibero-American Model Code of Judicial Ethics establishes that “[j]udges have the right and the obligation to denounce any attempt to interfere with their independence.” 2006 IberoAmerican Model Code of Judicial Ethics, article 6. Available at: http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/CUMBREJUDICIALIBEROAMERICANA/ Documents/CodigoEtico.pdf. 325 Affidavit made by Leandro Despouy on January 8, 2015 (evidence file, folio 6722). Similarly, see Expert opinion provide by Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez during the public hearing held in this case.