- 58 assert their loyalty to this.”326 Similarly, expert witness Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez indicated that, even for judges, “it is a legal obligation, a civic duty, to oppose [coups d’état].”327 174. It can therefore be concluded that, at times of grave democratic crises, as in this case, the norms that ordinarily restrict the right of judges to participate in politics are not applicable to their actions in defense of the democratic order. Thus, it would be contrary to the independence inherent in the branches of State, as well as the international obligations of the State derived from its membership of the OAS, that judges could not speak out against a coup d’état. Consequently, in view of the particular circumstances of this case, the conducts of the presumed victims on the basis of which disciplinary proceedings were instituted against them cannot be considered contrary to their obligations as judges and, thus, violations of the disciplinary regime that was applicable to them under ordinary circumstances. To the contrary, such conducts should be understood as a legitimate exercise of their rights as citizens to take part in politics, to freedom of expression, to the right of assembly and to protest, as applicable to the specific action taken by each of these presumed victims. 175. On this point, the Honduran Constitution stipulates that: Article 3. No one owes obedience to a government that has usurped power or to those who assume public functions or employments by force of arms or using means or procedures that violate or disregard the provisions of this Constitution and the law. Acts carried out by such authorities are null. The population has the right to resort to insurrection in defense of the constitutional order. […] Article 375. This Constitution does not cease to apply or require compliance based on the use of force or if it were supposedly derogated or amended by a means or procedure other than the one provided for herein. In such cases, any citizen, whether or not he holds a position of authority, has the duty to collaborate in maintaining or re-establishing its application. 176. Additionally, this Court has indicated that criminal proceedings may have “an intimidating or inhibiting effect on the exercise of freedom of expression, contrary to the state obligation to ensure the free and full exercise of this right in a democratic society.”328 The application of this consideration depends on the specific facts of each case.329 In the instant case, even though criminal proceedings are not involved, the Court considers that the mere fact of instituting disciplinary proceedings against the judges and the justice based on their actions against the coup d’état and in favor of the rule of law could have had this intimidating effect and, therefore, constituted an undue restriction of their rights. 177. Based on the above, the Court will now examine the events that occurred with regard to each of the presumed victims in order to determine whether the said restriction affected their rights to take part in politics, to freedom of expression and/or to the right of assembly. Subsequently, it will analyze jointly the alleged violation of freedom of association in relation to all the presumed victims. B.1) Adán Guillermo López Lone 326 Affidavit made by Martin Federico Böhmer on January 12, 2015 (evidence file, folio 6888). 327 Expert opinion provided by Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez during the public hearing held in this case. 328 Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela. Merits and reparations. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 249, para. 189. 329 Thus, for example, in the Case of Uzcátegui et al. criminal proceedings had been instituted against Mr. Uzcátegui, in which the plaintiff was a high-ranking officer (Commander General of Armed Police Forces of Falcón state), a context of violence existed, and the victim had been subjected to threats, harassment and unlawful detentions. Cf. Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 189.