- 68 removal of a judge or justice, and this could then be appealed before the Judicial Service Council364 (supra para. 82). However, these legally established procedures were not applied to the presumed victims in this case, but rather a hybrid or combination of the two.365 Thus, in the case of the presumed victims, although it was the Supreme Court that decided on their dismissal in first instance, as established in the Constitution, it did so following a recommendation by the Personnel Management Directorate, while the Judicial Service Council, which should act as an advisory organ to the Supreme Court in these decision pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, acted as an appellate or second instance body. In addition, in the appeals against the dismissals filed before the Judicial Service Council, the Personnel Management Directorate, which had “recommended” the respective dismissals, acted as “respondent party,” rather than the Supreme Court which had decided on the dismissals, even though the appeal was against the dismissal, and not against the recommendation made by the Personnel Management Directorate.366 209. According to information provided by the State itself, the procedure established in the Judicial Service Act and its Regulations was applicable to the presumed victims. Nevertheless, this had to be reconciled with the exclusive competence granted to the Supreme Court by the Constitution to remove judges or justices. The Court understands that it is not contrary to the Convention and is a common practice of the States Parties to the inter-American human rights system that, when analyzing a complete legal system, certain procedural norms are tacitly derogated by a subsequent norm or, as in this case, even a higher ranking norm, as the Honduran Constitution was. However, when harmonizing its laws, the State should ensure respect for the applicable guarantees and the legal certainty of defendants. 210. Based on the above (supra para. 208), the Court notes that, in this case, there was a total lack of clarity as regards the applicable procedure and the authorities that should hold the disciplinary proceedings against the presumed victims. In addition, the Court underscores that the judges and the justice, presumed victims in this case, alleged before this Court and before the domestic proceedings that there was a lack of certainty as regards the applicable procedure and the body that should process and decide their disciplinary proceedings.367 364 In this regard, the Regulations governing the Judicial Service Act established that: “[t]he Personnel Management Directorate w[ould] taken the final decision on whether or not to ratify the disciplinary sanction against the employee, giving written notice of its decision to the person concerned. The dismissal [was] final once the appeals filed by the person concerned had been exhausted and decided. […] The judicial employee affected by a disciplinary measure or by dismissal m[ight], within ten working days from the date of notification of the disciplinary measure or the dismissal, appeal before the Judicial Service Council.” Regulations governing the Judicial Service Act, articles 188 and 190 (evidence file, folio 201). 365 Expert witness Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez also referred to this when he indicated that “the Honduran system, at that time, provided for or established two alternative and, I would say, contradictory procedures,” and “a third procedure, which was not established either by law or in the Constitution, is the one that was used [in this case], under which there was a complaint by the Inspectorate, the Personnel Management Directorate held the preliminary hearing, the Supreme Court took the decision, and an appeal, which was legally inexistent, was heard by the Council of the Judiciary.” Expert opinion provided by Perfecto Andrés Ibáñez during the public hearing in this case. 366 In this regard, see decisions of the Judicial Service Council of August 24, 2011, with regard to Adán Guillermo López Lone, Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha, Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza and Ramón Enrique Barrios Maldonado (evidence file, folio 1057, 2218, 2817 and 3499). In these proceedings, in addition to indicating the Personnel Management Directorate as the respondent party, the Judicial Service Council justified the transfer of the appeal to the Personnel Management Directorate, prior to holding the hearing, contrary to the provisions of the Judicial Service Act and its Regulations, in application of complementary provisions so that, respecting the principle of “equality of arms, it was guaranteeing the right of the Personnel Management Directorate to defend itself.” Decisions of the Judicial Service Council of August 24, 2011, with regard to Adán Guillermo López Lone, Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha, Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza and Ramón Enrique Barrios Maldonado (evidence file, folios 1064 and 1065, 2224, 2826 and 3506). 367 Thus, Mr. López Lone testified before the Court that “throughout the processing of the disciplinary procedure my colleagues and I endured a situation of complete uncertainty; we did not know against whom we were litigating; we did not know in which instances we were litigating; we were completely unaware of who would hear our statements, who would receive the evidence, who would assess the evidence; we were litigating before bodies that were hierarchically dependent on the Supreme Court of Justice.” Statement made by Adán Guillermo López Lone during the public hearing held in this case. Judge Chévez de la Rocha testified similarly, when indicating that he “was never able to be certain about the norms and