- 79 had been filed, a series of interpretations would have been required in order to overcome the prohibition contained in article [31] of the rules of procedure.” It also indicated that the application for amparo would not be effective because it would be decided by the Supreme Court of Justice, and there were no clear rules concerning the way in which its ad hoc members would be appointed to hear the cases of the presumed victims. 243. The representatives argued that Honduran law did not establish an adequate and effective remedy against the Judicial Service Council’s decisions on disciplinary matters, because article 31 of the rules of procedure of the Judicial Service Council prevented filing appeals against its decisions. Regarding the State’s argument that, this article had already been derogated at the time, they indicated that this “does not correspond to what happened in this case, because the [Judicial Service Council] applied this norm against the four victims […]; if it had not been in force, the organ regulated by this instrument should have abstained from invoking this article, or even proceeded to amend the corresponding rules of procedure.” They added that the State was basing itself on a false assumption, which was that the situation in Honduras was normal. According to the representatives, the application for amparo was illusory because the Judiciary lacked the necessary independence to take an impartial decision in view of the fact that “it corresponded to the Constitutional Chamber to hear the [application for amparo]” and the justices who composed that Chamber were part of the Supreme Court of Justice. They also refuted the State’s argument that recusal could have been used, because “the incorporation of a new chamber does not offer the guarantees of independence and impartiality necessary for access to effective judicial protection.” According to the representatives, “Honduran law does not establish the procedure to be applied when a recusal is filed against the whole deliberative body” because “there is no procedure for substitution when all the members of a chamber are recused and, above all, when the whole of the Supreme Court of Justice is recused.” 244. The State responded that the presumed victims “did not file a judicial remedy, such as the application for amparo, to establish their innocence and achieve, if possible, what they are now requesting before the Inter-American Court.” It indicated that article 31 of the rules of procedure “was derogated at the time,” so that “the filing of the application for amparo was fully possible.” According to the State, article 320 of the Constitution stipulated that “in cases of incompatibility between a constitutional norm and an ordinary legal norm, the former [would] apply [and] during the course of the administrative proceeding and to date, none of [the presumed victims] used this right granted to them by the Constitution and the laws of Honduras.” In addition, it argued that “they had the option to file a judicial action to achieve their reinstatement or to obtain the legal compensation that they believe or consider corresponds to them.” The State added that “[a]lthough what the Inter-American Commission indicates is true as regards the procedure in the case of a possible recusal of the justices of the Constitutional Chamber who would be called on to hear an application for amparo, this does not mean that, in this case, those appointed would act in a biased manner. That is a groundless pre-judgment made by the petitioners that is offensive to all [their] country’s lawyers.” F.2) Considerations of the Court 245. The Court has indicated that Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes the obligation of the States Parties to ensure, to all persons subject to their jurisdiction, a simple, prompt and effective judicial remedy before a competent judge or court. The Court recalls its consistent case law that this remedy must be adequate and effective.416 Regarding effectiveness, for this effective remedy to exist it is not sufficient that it is established in the Constitution or the law, or that it is formally admissible; rather, it must be truly appropriate to establish whether a human rights violation has 416 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 63; and Case of Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Televisión) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 282.