- 86 265. In addition, regarding the definition of the punishable conducts, the Court points out that the presumed victims received disciplinary sanctions based on numerous norms. The Court recalls that the presumed victims were initially dismissed by means of a decision of the plenum of the Supreme Court of Justice (supra paras. 95, 115, 132 and 145).437 In this regard, this Court notes that, each decision included a short description of the acts or conducts that were being punished, and then enumerated the norms that had supposedly been infringed, without explaining sufficiently the relationship between the acts and the norms indicated (supra paras. 95, 115, 132 and 145). The Court notes that the mere enumeration of the norms that could be applicable to the acts or conducts does not meet the requirements of an adequate reasoning. 266. However, in the two cases in which the dismissals were confirmed by the Superior Council of the Judicial Service (Adán Guillermo López Lone and Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza), the decisions issued by this body contained a more detailed legal and factual analysis of the conducts attributed to each of the presumed victims. Nevertheless, ultimately, it was found that they both committed the same offense because they gave as grounds for the sanctions imposed not only those articles of the Judicial Service Act and of its Regulations that specifically established the offending conducts, but also other provisions contained in a large variety of laws and regulations without making the corresponding factual and legal analysis in relation to the supposed violation. In this regard, it should be pointed out that, in this case, domestic law required that, in order to determine the applicable sanction, “the severity of the offense, [and] the background to the case” must be taken into account, as well as “the nature of the offense, the functions performed by the offender, [and] his degree of participation in the offense” (supra para. 74). 267. In the case of disciplinary sanctions imposed on judges, the requirement of including a statement of reasons is even greater than in other disciplinary proceedings, because the purpose of the disciplinary control is to assess the conduct, suitability, and performance of the judge as a public official and, consequently, the seriousness of the conduct and the proportionality of the sanction require analysis.438 In the disciplinary sphere, it is essential to indicate the offense precisely and to develop arguments that allow it to be concluded that the offending conducts are sufficiently serious to justify removing the judge from his post.439 437 In this regard, the Court notes that the plenum of the Supreme Court of Justice decided the dismissal of the four presumed victims in this case in a session that commenced on May 5 and concluded on May 7, 2010. The record of that session indicates that the plenum of the Court appointed a committee of three justices to “draw up the respective resolution, and then to issue the corresponding dismissal decision” (supra paras. 94, 114, 131 and 144). However, the disciplinary files contain decisions dated May 5, 2010, signed by the President and the Secretary of the Supreme Court, in which, apparently following up on the orders of the plenum of the Court, they set out “the corresponding grounds, which have been approved, adding the date that the plenum was held” (supra paras. 94, 114, 131 and 144). The decisions of the Judicial Service Council indicate that the dismissals of the presumed victims were based on grounds outlined in the May 5 decisions that were attached and that are in the case file. The Court notes that it is unclear what the nature and purpose of these decisions of the President were within the disciplinary proceedings of the presumed victims, because they were not issued by the committee of three justices that had been appointed by the plenum of the Supreme Court, and there is no record that they were notified to the presumed victims. Therefore, this Court will not take into account the said decisions of the President of the Supreme Court of May 5, 2010, to explain the grounds for the sanctions imposed on the presumed victims by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, even though the presumed victims learned of their dismissal in advance through the press and even filed appeals for review in this regard, it was not until the notification of the dismissal decisions on June 4, 2010 (Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza, supra para. 115 and Luis Alonso Chévez de la Rocha, supra para. 132) and on June 16 (Adán Guillermo López Lone, supra para. 95 and Ramón Barrios Maldonado, supra para. 145), that they were officially notified of the decisions of the Supreme Court in relation to their disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, these decisions constitute the documents in which the Supreme Court announced its decisions. 438 Cf. Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra, para. 120. Similarly, this Court has be applied that is proportionate to the nature and seriousness of the offense, taking aggravating circumstances that could be relevant to the case. Cf. Case of Raxcacó Reyes and costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 133, para. 133, and Case of the Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163, para. 196. 439 Cf. Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra, para. 120. ordered that a punishment should into account any attenuating or v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia.