5 binding for the case to which it refers,15 and obviously may be amended by the Court itself, since there is no impediment to this, except the eventual preference that the Court could adopt in favor of a more conservative position in this regard. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to invoke respect for human rights or the pro homine principle16 as justification to prolong indefinitely, as in this case, the regulatory mechanism of monitoring compliance with judgment, without advising the OAS General Assembly as established in Article 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute. And this is because Article 65 does not include the hypothesis to apply that principle in the instant case; in other words, the mechanism of monitoring compliance with judgment is not a right recognized in the Convention, but rather an instrument provided by the Rules of Procedure (not by the Convention or the Statute), to allow the Court to comply in a more effective way with the obligation imposed on it by Articles 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute with regard to the OAS General Assembly, and thus liable to be required by the latter. Lastly, it would not be justifiable to argue – in support of the position of not complying with the provisions of Articles 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute, even though a period that is more than prudent and reasonable has elapsed since the judgment was handed down without the State having executed the essential rulings – that a regulatory mechanism of monitoring compliance with judgment promotes and guarantees respect for human rights, which would not be the case if information were provided in the terms set out in those provisions. Moreover, this argument would not be justifiable, because it disregards that, as stated on another occasion,17 the best guarantee of respect for human rights is that the Court adjust its conduct strictly to the norms, especially those of the Convention that governs it. The unconditional respect for the “rule of law” that is required of the States in relation to human rights can also, and with greater reason, be required of the Court, especially when we recall, on the one hand, that its function is to impart justice in relation to human rights by applying the relevant law, and not to promote such rights, which falls within the competence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,18 or to decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law.” 15 Art. 59 idem: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” 16  Art. 29 of the Convention: “Restrictions regarding Interpretation.   No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: (a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; (b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; (c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or (d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have. 17 See Note No. 13. 18 Art. 41 of the Convention: “The main function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and defense of human rights. In the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following functions and powers: (a) to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America;