132. Regarding Article 7(4) of the Convention, the Court has considered that “the facts must be analyzed under domestic law and the provisions of the Convention, because information on the ‘reasons and grounds’ for the detention must be provided ‘when this occurs’ and because the right contained this article entails two obligations: (a) oral or written information on the reasons for the detention, and (b) notification, in writing, of the charges.”189 Thus, both the Immigration Act and the Regulations in force determined that aliens held for deportation purposes must be informed of the specific reasons why they would be subject to deportation. In this regard, the evidence provided in this case reveals that at no time during the deprivation of liberty were these persons informed of the reasons and grounds for their detention, either verbally or in writing. In addition, there is no document to prove that the detainees were informed in writing of the existence of any kind of charge against them, which was contrary to the domestic norms in force at the time of the facts (supra para. 128) and, therefore, violated Article 7(2) and 7(4) of the American Convention on Human Rights, to the detriment of the detained victims. 133. Moreover, regarding the arbitrary nature of the detention referred to in Article 7(3) of the Convention, the Court has considered that “no one may be subjected to detention or imprisonment for causes or by methods that, although classified as legal, could be regarded as incompatible with respect for fundamental human rights, because, inter alia, they are unreasonable, unpredictable or disproportionate.”190 Therefore, any detention must be carried out not only in accordance with domestic legal provisions, but it is also necessary that “domestic law, the applicable procedure, and the corresponding general explicit or tacit principles are, in themselves, compatible with the Convention.”191 Thus, “the concept of 'arbitrariness' cannot be equated with that of 'contrary to the law,’ but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of irregularity, injustice and unpredictability.”192 134. In this regard, the State argued that the detainees “remained in the country for a few hours, since they entered Dominican territory undocumented in the early morning hours, so that they had to wait until the formalities were initiated during working hours in order to be returned to their country of origin.” Nevertheless, from the statements of the victims, the Court notes that the authorities did not keep them detained with the intention of bringing them before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power or in order to formulate charges against them in keeping with the domestic norms (supra paras. 54 and 55). Thus, after analyzing the evidence in the case file, the Court considers that the arrests were not made in order to carry out a procedure capable of determining the circumstances and legal status of the detainees, or even to conduct a formal immigration procedure for their deportation or expulsion,193 which means that they were detentions for unlawful purposes and, consequently, arbitrary, in violation of Article 7(3) of the Convention, to the detriment of the detained victims. 189 Cf. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, para. 106, and Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti, supra, para. 60. Also, Cf. U.N., Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Prison, Adopted by the General Assembly in its Resolution 43/173, of 9 December 1988, Principle 10. 190 Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 47, and Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti, supra, para.57. 191 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 91, and Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti, supra, para. 58. 192 Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra, para. 92, and Case of Fleury et al. v. Haiti, supra, para. 58. See also, Human Rights Committee, Case of Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, (458/1991), 21 July 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para. 9.8. 193 In this regard, see Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Conclusions and December 2003, UN DOC E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 86. 40 recommendations of 15