18 . conventional obligations, that right to petition throughout all the phases of proceedings before international instances. C) Alleged violations 64. The Commission and the representatives held that the State is responsible for the violation of the liberty to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas (Article 13(1) of the Convention). 65. The Commission argued that the acts described in the application constituted restrictions “of the essential content of the right to freedom of expression, namely, to seek, receive, and impart information freely,” in relation with the duty of guarantee included in Article 1(1) thereof, even though it did not specify in detriment of who nor did it individualize the facts that generated the violation, instead it referred generally to the fact that this right was “hindered both by acts or omissions of State agents as well as by actions of individuals.” It argued in its application that when the facts object of the present case started, Venezuela was in a “period of institutional and political climate that caused an extreme polarization of society that “generated a climate of continuous attacks and threats against journalists, cameramen, photographers, and other related workers of the social communication media.” The Commission argued that, in said context, certain speeches or pronouncements of the highest state authorities, among which it mentioned 10 statements or pronouncements of the President of The Republic, contributed in creating an environment of intolerance and social polarization, not compatible with the duty to prevent violations of human rights that corresponds to the State and that constituted “indirect means to the exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression,” which “may result in acts of violence against the people identified as employees of a specific communication firm.” 66. Upon observing that individuals committed the majority of the facts indicated in the application, the Commission argued that it is possible to attribute international responsibility to the State for these acts of third parties because it was aware of a situation of actual risk and did not adopt reasonable measures to avoid it. It stated that the vast majority of the facts occurred within the framework of events of high political and institutional interest, or in the coverage of a news story, even at a public protest where “partisans of the ruling party” as well as those of the “opposition” were present. The recurrence of this type of events directed against employees of social communication firms, “generated an evident intimidating effect on their desire to continue with their work in the future,” since the alleged victims are intimidated and have a well-founded fear that they may be the object of an attack based on their work relationship with the station. It considered that the State has not acted in a diligent manner with regard to its duty to investigate the facts and that the domestic investigations have taken much longer than could be reasonably expected. 67. The representatives agreed substantially with that argued by the Commission and they insisted that, even though the speeches of public authorities, even the ones with criticizing and insulting content, are covered in principle by the freedom of expression, this is not so when in a clear and imminent manner it promotes attacks against journalists and the media. In these cases, the State results responsible not only for the official violent speech in which RCTV, its journalists, and directors were attacked in a reiterated and systematic manner but for the aggressions caused by groups of individuals executing and following those messages. 68. The Commission and the representatives argued the violation of Article 5 of the Convention, although they differed with regard to the facts, arguments, and reasons that would substantiate the alleged violations.