31 . vulnerability79 and it must adopt, when appropriate, the measures necessary and reasonable to prevent or protect the rights of whoever is in that situation, as well as investigate facts that affect them. 108. In the present case, the Court observes that the majority of the facts claimed in the application as violations to Articles 5 and 13 were have been committed by individuals, in detriment of journalists and members of the reportorial teams, as well as the properties and headquarters of the station RCTV. 109. The Court has indicated that the State’s international responsibility can be the result of violating acts committed by third parties, which in principle would not be attributable to it.80 This occurs if the State fails to comply, by action or omission of its agents in a position of guarantors of human rights, the obligations erga omnes included in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. 110. The Court has also indicated that a State is not responsible for any violation of human rights committed by individuals. The erga omnes nature of the conventional obligations to guarantee does not imply an unlimited responsibility of the States with regard to any act of individuals. The specific circumstances of the case and the concretion of those obligations to guarantee must be analyzed, considering the predictability of a real and immediate risk.81 111. Based on the aforementioned criteria, the Tribunal shall analyze the facts claimed and the evidence presented, within the context in which they occurred. A) Context of the facts and speeches of public officials 112. As previously indicated (supra paras. 65, 66, and 69), the Commission considered that having “full knowledge of the situation of risk” and “of the occurrence of acts of violence on the streets and the headquarters of the RCTV station, during which journalists and social communication workers of that station were being attacked,” the State had a special duty of protection and it failed to comply with the duty to prevent that acts of third parties affect the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. 113. On their part, the representatives argued that the mentioned speeches constituted “threats and moral attacks against the different social communication media firms of the country and expressly against RCTV, its directors and shareholders,” whose content would prove “a continuous [S]tate policy of attacks and threats” against them. They presented three types of arguments regarding these pronouncements: a) that they constitute “in themselves, a violation to Venezuela’s international obligations” and a violation […] to the personal integrity of the members of the RCTV team;” b) that the physical attacks of which the alleged victims have been object “are the natural consequence of the aggressive and violent speeches of the President of the Republic and other high authorities” since “they have been tolerated, justified, and motivated by the President of the Republic himself;” and 79 Cf., inter alia, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03. Series A No. 18, paras. 112-172; Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” V. Colombia, supra note 38, paras. 173-189. 80 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” V. Colombia, supra note 38, para. 11a; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre V. Colombia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 113; and Valle Jaramillo et al. V. Colombia, supra note 29, para. 77. 81 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre V. Colombia, supra note 80, para. 123; and Valle Jaramillo et al. V. Colombia, supra note 29, para. 78.