essential requirement […] for any person to be able to receive compensation.” Regarding the representatives’ doubt about the application of the criterion concerning “the date of death” of the disappeared victims, the State indicated that it “can only take into account the decision of the judge who declares the presumed death of each person.” In addition, regarding subparagraphs (d) and (e) of paragraph 364 of the Judgment, it argued that “regarding the inheritance proceedings,” “the State will be governed by the principles established in domestic law, regardless of the time and expense that undertaking an inheritance proceeding entails for the beneficiaries.” Furthermore, the State “opposed […] taking into consideration” “the disappeared victims’ family members who were not identified during the litigation of the case before the Commission and the Court.” Nevertheless, it indicated that “the […] persons who may receive the amounts established by the Court […] are the persons identified in the [J]udgment, or their heirs duly accredited under domestic law.” Regarding the compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the State argued that it understood that the Court had “indicated that a domestic inheritance proceeding must be undertaken” and, in this regard, it “affirmed that it is not possible to make the payment to the heirs until they have been declared as such through the legal proceedings established by law,” which this “is a legal obligation and cannot be substituted, even if the […] Court indicates that they can be dispensed from complying with this requirement.” 30. The Commission indicated that “subparagraph (b) of paragraph 364 of the Judgment refers to the death of the victim; therefore, it would be consistent with the rest of the Judgment to change the wording of this paragraph to the start of the execution of the forced disappearance. Regarding subparagraphs (d) and (e), the Commission consider[ed] it useful and relevant to clarify the specific aspects mentioned by the representatives in order to facilitate prompt compliance with the reparations ordered.” As regards the compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the Commission indicated that, according to paragraph 375 of the Judgment, the criteria for the payment of the non-pecuniary damage are the same as those established in paragraph 364 in relation to the pecuniary damage. However, “the Court must assess whether paragraph 385 affects the said criteria and, if so, clarify this aspect.” Considerations of the Court 31. The Court reiterates that a request for interpretation should seek to clarify or render more precise the operative paragraphs of the judgment or the considerations that have an impact on the operative paragraphs of the judgment, rather than constituting a means of contesting the decision the interpretation of which is required (supra para. 10). In addition, the Court recalls that it is not possible to request the modification or annulment of the respective judgment by means of a request for interpretation. 12 Likewise, a request of this type cannot be used to expand the scope of a measure of reparation opportunely ordered. 13 32. The Court observes that the representatives raised several questions concerning the application of paragraph 364 of the Judgment regarding the payment of the compensation for loss of earnings and for non-pecuniary damage established in the Judgment, as well as how it should be understood in combination with paragraph 385 of the Judgment. The Court reiterates that it will deal with the questions concerning these two types of compensation (loss of earnings and non-pecuniary damage) together, because it considers that the representatives’ concerns in relation to the criteria established in the Judgment for complying with the two types of compensation are similar and related (supra para. 19). 12 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs, para. 16, and Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, supra, para. 11. 13 Cf. Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 208, para. 11. 8