Convention.” Therefore, it concluded that all the foregoing, together with “the clear lack of legal and constitutional grounds for the National Congress’s interpretation of Transitory Provision 25 of the 1998 Constitution, [implied] that the State of Ecuador [had] violated the right enshrined in Article 9 of the American Convention in conjunction with Article 2 thereof.” 128. According to the representatives, “[i]n Ecuador, at the time of the judges’ dismissal by Congress, there was no law specifying the grounds for removing judges of the Supreme Court of Justice”, which would violate “one of the rules of the principle of legality.” Indeed, the representatives argued that under Article 202 of the Constitution in force at that time, “the competent authority for appointing and dismissing judges wa[s] the [Supreme Court of Justice] itself.” They pointed out that “[t]he Supreme Court’s own interpretation of this provision was that the plenary of the [Supreme Court of Justice], being the nominating body, reserved the right to revoke that appointment by means of a disciplinary procedure.” Thus, on October 2, 2003 the Supreme Court published the document entitled “Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear complaints submitted against its member judges”, which “was the only constitutional provision in force at the time of the events.” Consequently, according to the representatives, the proceeding was a punitive “ad hoc trial”, in no way contemplated in the Ecuadorian legal system. The representatives concluded that “[t]he Ecuadorian State violated Article 9 of the Convention by failing to establish the legal grounds for dismissing a judge and a proceeding with all the guarantees of due process.” 129. In its answer brief, the State argued that “Resolution 25-181, declaring the termination of the judges, was neither a judgment nor a sanction stemming from an accusation against the judges, but was merely complying with a constitutional provision which must be observed and which established legal effects that were already known to the alleged victims.” Subsequently, in acknowledging during the public hearing that Article 9 of the Convention had been violated, the State explained that because “the law did not contain specific grounds for removing judges from office, the National Congress’s resolution could have been understood as an ad-hoc proceeding of a punitive nature.” 8. Arguments regarding Article 2 of the Convention 130. The Commission argued that a link exists between Article 25 and Article 2 of the American Convention, given that the latter establishes “the general duty of States to adapt their domestic legislation to the provisions of this Convention to guarantee the rights enshrined therein, established in Article 2, including such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms enshrined therein, as well as the adoption of measures to suppress provisions and practices of any nature violate the guarantees contemplated in the Convention.” 131. The representatives argued that Article 2 of the Convention was violated because “Ecuador had not issued a law [that established] the grounds for the dismissal of judges.” They also argued that although “Ecuador has undertaken a profound legal reform in issuing the 2008 Constitution and the Organic Code of the Judiciary,” currently there are some “provisions that could undermine judicial independence.” The foregoing, in consideration that “a representative appointed by the President of the Republic who heads the Council of the Judiciary and this body has the power to administratively sanction judges, including justices of the current National Court of Justice, which jeopardizes the principle of independence and impartiality of justice.” The representatives added that “the State violated Article 2 of the Convention by failing to establish legal or other measures to prevent a repetition of the violations committed against the judges of the [Supreme Court of Justice] in 2004.” 40