the principle of estoppel, since the certificates were issued during the execution phase, not the negotiation phase, and the amounts were calculated up until August 2011. The State thereby adopted a position within the process, which it cannot change for its own benefit since this is prohibited under international law. 227. Moreover, the representatives requested that the compensation be paid to each of the judges or their successors, regardless of whether or not they had held public office, arguing that upon calculating the settlement, the State did not take this factor into account. The representatives also pointed out that the payment of unpaid wages to the victims is a form of reparation, and therefore no distinction should be made between those who tried to survive by finding work in the private sector, and those who worked in the public sector, since this would be a discriminatory measure. The representatives stressed that the State was using this as a new argument regarding the issue of reparations and that it had never put forward any document during the evidence phase that could justify this position. The representatives further argued that the former judges who “again obtained public positions did so on their own merits and not because of any acknowledgement of a violation of their rights […] since the fact that some had returned to public life did not mean that all enjoyed that privilege and, as Dr. Arturo Donoso stated, they had to make a living and if that meant returning to public life they had to do so, but the return to public life has nothing to do with the violation of rights and with acknowledgement of that violation, in relation to temporality.” 228. As to the request for payment of unpaid salaries, the State asked the Court to take into consideration that “the settlement report is neither binding nor referential.” The State considered that, as a result of its partial acquiescence, the pecuniary reparations should not be higher than the amount the judges would have received had they continued in their positions, in accordance with the 1998 Constitution, i.e. until October 20, 2008, since the rights acquired under the 1998 Constitution were fulfilled in 2008. The State based this argument on the legitimacy of and change to a new constitutional order. It also argued that the monetary sum should be in line with the amounts previously set by the Court, otherwise there would be two major effects: it would discriminate against those persons who had previously had recourse to the Inter-American System and would affect the general interest since the monies paid would come from public funds. The State indicated that, in good faith and based on accounting documents, it established the amounts the former judges should receive, amounts equivalent to the salaries that they did not receive according to the constitutional structure of 1998. 229. The State pointed out that, upon making the calculation, the Court should keep in mind those judges who held public office after their dismissal. The State indicated that Judges Velasco, Troya and Donoso held public office after their dismissal. Considerations of the Court 230. In its case law the Court has developed the concept of pecuniary damage and has established that this implies “loss or detriment to the victims’ income, the expenditures made due to the facts and the consequences of a pecuniary nature which have a causal nexus with the facts of the case.” 252 231. Based on the arguments put forward by the parties, the Court deems it necessary to define the criteria that will be taken into account in setting the amounts corresponding to pecuniary damage. To that end the Court will proceed to: i) establish the pecuniary damage 252 Cf. Case of Bamaca Velasquez v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 22, 2002. Series C No. 91, para. 43, and Case of Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, para. 212. 65