certain expectation of ending his days as a judge, since there was no legal term for the exercise of his duties.” 255. The State argued that the sum of USD $500,000.00 “exceeds the […] amount that the Court has established in equity.” Furthermore, it argued that the sworn statements which sought to demonstrate non-pecuniary damage “[w]ere not a suitable instrument” for establishing the facts they sought to prove, since they “cannot be compare[d] and [are] inadequate from an accounting and technical point of view [, ] inasmuch as these sworn statements do not include asset calculations cross-referenced with tax statements, property titles, appraisals, receipts or other accounting documents that could attest to the possible damage caused.” Regarding the alleged injurious comments made against the former judges, the State indicated that domestic law contemplates procedures to obtain redress for such damage, and that the victims could have approached the media organizations that made the statements to request the right to reply to the comments made. The State held that it had no involvement in those actions. 256. Given the “ambiguity of the arguments and the absence of criteria for determining non-pecuniary damages”, the State requested that the financial compensation be rejected and that “in the event of a judgment being issued […], and having regard to the right to equality [, the] Court [should bear in mind the amounts set in other cases.” The State argued that the amount established by the Court should not exceed ten thousand dollars. Finally, it argued that “the life project of each of the dismissed judges who completed the term for which they were appointed […] was never […] limit[ed] by the State [and] in the event of a conviction, [the State] would design measures of satisfaction and non-repetition that would provide comprehensive reparation.” Considerations of the Court 257. In its case law, the Court has developed the concept of non-pecuniary damage and has established that this “may include the suffering and anguish caused to the direct victims and their families, the harm done to values of great significance to the individual, as well as changes of a non-pecuniary nature in the living conditions of the victim or his family.” 279 Since it is not possible to assign a precise monetary value to non-pecuniary damage, it may only be subject to compensation for the purpose of providing comprehensive reparation to the victim, through payment of a sum of money or the provision of goods or services of appreciable cash value, which the Court determines in the reasonable exercise of its judicial authority and on the basis of equity. 280 258. The Court reiterates that such indemnities are of a compensatory character, and that their nature and amount depend on the damage caused; therefore, they are not supposed to enrich or impoverish the victims or their heirs. 281 259. In this case the Commission did not request compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Court has held that non-pecuniary damage is evident, since it is part of human 279 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs, para. 84, and Case Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, para. 350. 280 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of December 3, 2001. Series C No. 88, para. 53, and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010 Series C No. 218, para. 310. 281 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 25, 2001. Series C No. 76, para. 79, and Case Artavia Murillo et al. ("In Vitro Fertilization") v. Costa Rica, para. 362. 73