40. To establish non-compliance with the obligation to prevent violations of the rights to life and personal integrity, the Court referred to the case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, to indicate the factors that must be verified as regards the obligation of prevention, which were the State’s awareness of the real and immediate risk for those rights, and the adoption of measures by the authorities to prevent or avoid that risk.70 Subsequently, the Inter-American Court repeated the criterion of the “two moments” of the obligation of prevention in the present judgment, indicating that this must be analyzed with regard to the “first moment” (before the disappearance Claudina Velásquez: general obligation to prevent the disappearance and murder of women), and the “second moment” (before the discovery of the body of Claudina Velásquez: specific obligation to prevent violations of the rights to integrity and life of Claudina Velásquez”), in order to corroborate the existence of Guatemala’s international responsibility. 71 41. Regarding the “first moment” — before the disappearance Claudina Velásquez — I consider it pertinent to underline the Court’s analysis regarding the existence, in 2001, of a context of an escalation of homicidal violence against women in Guatemala.72 Also, the subsequent mention of the measures taken by the State following the case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, as well as the measures and mechanisms implemented by the State before and after the facts of the case examined in this judgment,73 which it then compared with with reports of national and international agencies and organizations that criticized the effectiveness of such measures and institutions,74 while acknowledging the State’s initiative of implementing “actions aimed at addressing the problem of violence against women,” but revealing the insufficiency of such measures.75 In this regard, I should stress that the analysis of this “first moment” does not conclude with a ruling by the Court, which I consider should have been made owing to its importance and the special consequences on the following moment (the “second moment”). 42. When examining the “second moment” — before the discovery of the body of Claudina Velásquez — the Court analyzed, on the one hand, the moment at “which the State authorities knew or ought to have known about the existence of a real and immediate danger to the life and integrity of Claudina Velásquez” determining that this was the moment at which the authorities received the telephone call from the victim’s parents; 76 and, on the other hand, “the steps taken by the Guatemalan authorities, knowing the context and the nature of the danger reported, [and also whether they] promptly took the necessary measures within the scope of their powers” to prevent or avoid that danger.77 43. In this regard, and following an analysis of the facts already described in the judgment, it determined that the response of the authorities had been “clearly insufficient given the possibility that the [victim’s] personal integrity and life were in danger,” 78 and also the lack of clarity in the law regarding the proper moment to file a report, 79 considering Para. 109 of the judgment. Para. 110 of the judgment. 72 Para. 111 of the judgment. 73 Paras. 112 and ff. of the judgment. 74 Para. 118 a 120 of the judgment. 75 Para. 120 of the judgment. 76 Para. 121 of the judgment. 77 Para. 123 of the judgment. 78 Para. 126 of the judgment. 79 In this regard, it its worth mentioning, first, that the Court noted the lack of clarity as to the moment as of which the 24-hour period before presentation of the report that Claudina Velásquez was missing should have been calculated. Second, in response to its request to the State for information concerning the existence of any law or practice according to which it was necessary to wait 24 hours to receive missing person reports, the State indicated 70 71 12