identified individual or group of individuals – or that the State should be aware of this situation of real and immediate risk – and the reasonable possibility of preventing or avoiding this risk.181 In other words, even though the legal consequence of an individual’s act or omission is the violation of certain human rights of another individual, this cannot automatically be attributed to the State because the particular circumstances of the case and the implementation of this obligation of guarantee must be taken into account. 182 In this regard, the Court clarifies that, in order to establish non-compliance with the obligation to prevent violations of the rights to life and personal integrity, it must be verified that: (i) the State authorities knew, or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk for the life and/or personal integrity of an identified individual or group of individuals, and (ii) these authorities failed to take the necessary measures within the scope of their powers that, judged reasonably, might have been expected to prevent or avoid that risk. 183 This has been the Court’s criteria since the delivery of the judgment in the case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia,184 and it has been reiterated in its consistent case law.185 110. In the instant case, there are two moments at which the obligation of prevention must be analyzed. The first is before the disappearance of Claudina Velásquez and the second is before the discovery of her body. B.1. Before the disappearance Claudina Velásquez: general obligation to prevent the disappearance and murder of women 111. Regarding the first moment – that is, before the disappearance of Claudina Velásquez, the Court has already established that, in December 2001, there was a context of an escalation of homicidal violence against women in Guatemala, that this increase had grown constantly throughout the country in 2004 and 2005, and that, to this day, the levels continue to be very Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 123, and Case of the Human Rights Defender et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 140. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has understood that: “[…] not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materializing. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual […] from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.” Cf. ECHR, Case of Kiliç v. Turkey, No. 22492/93, Judgment of March 28, 2000, paras. 62 and 63, and ECHR, Osman v. the United Kingdom, No. 23452/94, Judgment of October 28, 1998, paras. 115 and 116. 182 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 123, and Case of the Human Rights Defender et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 140. 183 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 123, and Case of the Human Rights Defender et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 143. 184 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra, paras. 123 and 124, citing ECHR, Case of Kiliç v. Turkey, No. 22492/93, Judgment of March 28, 2000, paras. 62 and 63, and ECHR, Osman v. the United Kingdom No. 23452/94, Judgment of October 28. 1998, paras. 115 and 116. The original text of paragraph 116 of the case of Osman indicates: “[…] In the opinion of the Court where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to prevent and suppress offences against the person (see paragraph 115 above), it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. […] For the Court, and having regard to the nature of the right protected by Article 2, a right fundamental in the scheme of the Convention, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge.” 185 See, Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra, paras. 283 and 284; Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 155; Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 24, 2010. Series C No. 214, para. 188; Case of Castillo González et al. v. Venezuela. Merits. Judgment of November 27, 2012. Series C No. 256, para. 128; Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013. Series C No. 269, para. 124; Case of the Human Rights Defender et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 143, and Case of Rodríguez Vera et al. (Disappeared of the Palace of Justice) v. Colombia, supra, para. 527. 181 39