proceedings” and that the detention was “strictly necessary.” Furthermore, the presumed victims were never detained unlawfully because, in compliance with article 24.8 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, when the time limit for pre-trial detention had been completed, their immediate release was ordered. 78. The State also argued that, in the decision of January 27, 2004, the National Police Court of Justice “used an erroneous term with regard to the determination of the type of detention,” when “it annulled the detención en firme […] and, in its place confirmed the detention […] in the terms established by [article] 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the National Police.” It concluded that the deprivation of liberty of the presumed victims observed the provisions of Article 7 of the American Convention “because they were deprived of their liberty in compliance with the law; therefore, there was no unlawful deprivation of liberty.” A.2 Considerations of the Court 79. The Court will now examine whether the deprivation of liberty of the presumed victims in the context of the police criminal proceedings was in keeping with the standards established in the Convention and developed by this Court’s case law. However, before referring to those standards, it is necessary to determine whether or not the presumed victims were subjected to detención en firme because, while the Commission and the representative have argued that the State applied detención en firme to the victims, the State argues that this expression was used erroneously in the decision of May 26, 2003, and that this mechanism was not applied to the presumed victims; rather the true intention of the judge was to order pre-trial detention.94 80. From the evidence in the case file, the Court concludes that the presumed victims were subjected to detención en firme and that this was not a mere factual error in the decision of May 2003. It is undeniable that, on May 26, 2003, the president of the NPCJ ordered the “detención en firme of the accused as presumed perpetrators and accomplices,”95 pursuant to article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the National Police and the corresponding article 253 of the common Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court also notes that this expression is used in other documents in the case file and it has been verified that this measure was applied in the decision of May 26. 96 The State argued that this decision was based on article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the National Civil Police and that article 253 of the common Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the measure of pre-trial detention so that an unlawful deprivation of liberty does not exist. 94 95 Cf. Reasoned order of the president of the National Police Court of Justice of May 26, 2003, supra. For example, it is worth noting that, in the opinion of one of the judges on the decision of the National Police Court of Justice of July 3, 2003, rejecting the application for amparo filed by Mr. Cevallos Moreno, his detención en firme was inadmissible; he stated that “considering that the application for protection of liberty was lawfully filed and the inadmissibility of detención en firme established in art. 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure included in Law No. 2003-101 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure published in Official Record No. 743 of January 13, 2003, under which General Inspector (sp) Mario Cevallos Moreno has been deprived of liberty, the application should be admitted and the immediate release of the appellant ordered.” Cf. Judgment of the National Police Court of Justice of July 3, 2003 (evidence file, fs. 2672 to 2681). Also, the decision of the National Police Court of Justice of July 31, 2003, which concluded that “the appeal for declaration of nullity filed by the defendants is unsubstantiated,” took into consideration the reasoned order of May 26, 2003, and indicated in paragraphs: “(b) The reasoned order requiring detención en firme in violation of art. 16 of the law amending the common Code of Criminal Procedure (art. 17.A),” and “(e) That the defendants were informed of the detención en firme required in the reasoned order 24 hours later,” without ruling in this regard. Cf. Judicial decision of the National Police Court of Justice of July 31, 2003, rejecting the appeal for declaration of nullity of the reasoned order of May 26, 2003, supra. Similarly, the judicial decision of the National Police Court of Justice of November 11, 2003, referring to the reasoned order against the presumed victims, indicates “ordering the detención en firme of the accused as presumed perpetrators and accomplices, a precautionary measure that they will serve in the Equitation and Remount Unit of the National Police.” Cf. Judicial decision of the National Police Court of Justice, of November 11, 2003, denying the requests to expand and clarify the reasoned order and the appeal for declaration of nullity and ratifying the reasoned order, supra. In addition, the order to initiate a trial for the offense of malfeasance in office issued by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice on October 13, 2006, indicates in its sixth paragraph: “[…] based on these precedents, it is clearly and conclusively established that, when issuing the reasoned order, General (sp) Byron Pinto Muñoz unlawfully and unduly applied the provisions that refer to detención en 96 22