163. The Commission indicated that “Article 4(1) of the Convention can be interpreted to mean that a State is granted the power to regulate the protection of life from the moment of conception, but is not necessarily a mandate to grant this protection.” It argued that this article “does not establish an absolute or categorical right in relation to the prenatal stages of life” and that “an international and comparative recognition [exists] of the concept of gradual and incremental protection of life at the prenatal stage.” The Commission added that “the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Convention indicates that the exercise of a right conceived by this international instrument is not exempt from scrutiny [by the Court] when it interferes with the exercise of other rights established therein, such as, in this case, the rights to private life, family life, autonomy and to found a family.” 164. Representative Molina argued that “conception […] is not a clear-cut concept,” and that “the Chamber’s decision adhered to a specific philosophical tendency as regards [its] definition, […] disregarding the protection required by the reproductive disability to procreate.” He added that “the phrase ‘in general’ […] presupposes the existence of sufficient exceptions to ensure that other rights are not left unprotected” and that “an interpretation is required with regard to the right to life that permits and does not restrict absolutely the safeguard of the treaty-based rights.” 165. Representative May argued that the right to life “is not absolute or unrestricted” and “is subject to exceptions and conditions.” He indicated that “the case law of the international human rights bodies […] has never affirmed that the unborn child deserves absolute, unrestricted and unconditional protection from the moment of conception or implantation” and “nor have the Constitutional Courts made this assertion.” He noted that although “[d]omestic law can grant a broader protection, […] this expanded protection cannot eliminate the enjoyment and exercise of rights.” He argued that the definitions in several dictionaries indicate that the “moment of fertilization is a distinct process to that of conception or implantation.” In addition, he argued that any legal protection of life as of the moment of “conception” must arise as of the implantation of the embryo in the mother’s uterus, “because prior to successful and healthy implantation in the maternal uterus, there is no possibility of creating a new being.” He stated that “[p]ostulating fertilization as the creation of a new human being is arbitrary and incorrect” and “undervalues the role of the mother during development in the uterus.” In addition, he argued that “live birth determines the existence of the human being and the recognition of his or her legal personality,” so that the unborn child “is not the holder of an unlimited and unconditional right to life,” and “[t]he unborn child is a legally protected interest, but not a person.” 166. Representative May argued that “Article 4(1) [of the American Convention does not] contemplate […] the embryo within its content or ratio legis” and that international human rights treaties do not contain “an explicit indication from which it can be inferred that an embryo or a pre-embryo constitutes human life, and even less that it is a human person or a human being.” He added that the “position of the margin of appreciation” was unsustainable because it would make the substantive content of human rights depend on the State’s interpretation.” Representative May argued that “[n]o international text (except Article 4(1) [of the Convention] protects the right to life from the moment or process of conception or implantation,” while the “other international instruments only refer to a right that protects the life of the individual who has been born alive, and not the unborn child.” 167. The State alleged that “scientific evidence […] reveals that human life begins with conception, or what is the same, with fertilization,” which occurs when “the membranes of the cells of the spermatozoid and the egg merge.” It considered that “[s]cientifically, the zygote and the adult are equivalent, [because they are] complete human organisms at different stages of the human life cycle.” It added that the zygote “is not simply a human