support the view that [Article 2] does not include the unborn child.” 369 It added that recognizing an absolute right to prenatal life would be “contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.” 370 It indicated that “[t]he ‘life’ of the foetus is intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant woman. If Article 2 were held to cover the foetus and its protection under this Article were, in the absence of any express limitation, seen as absolute, an abortion would have to be considered as prohibited even where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a serious risk to the life of the pregnant woman. This would mean that the ‘unborn life’ of the foetus would be regarded as being of a higher value than the life of the pregnant woman.” 371 The Commission confirmed this position in the cases of R.H. v. Norway (1992) and Boso v. Italy (2002), concerning the presumed violation of the right to life to the detriment of the unborn child owing to State laws that permitted abortion. 372 237. In the Case of Vo. v. France, in which the petitioner had to undergo a therapeutic abortion due to the danger to her health as a result of inadequate medical treatments, the European Court stated that: Unlike Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which provides that the right to life must be protected “in general, from the moment of conception”, Article 2 of the Convention is silent as to the temporal limitations of the right to life and, in particular, does not define “everyone” […] whose “life” is protected by the Convention. The Court has yet to determine the issue of the “beginning” of “everyone’s right to life” within the meaning of this provision and whether the unborn child has such a right.” […] The issue of when the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions” […]. The reasons for that conclusion are, firstly, that the issue of such protection has not been resolved within the majority of the Contracting States themselves, in France in particular, where it is the subject of debate […] and, secondly, that there is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life. […] At European level, the Court observes that there is no consensus on the nature and status of the embryo and/or fetus […], although they are beginning to receive some protection in the light of scientific progress and the potential consequences of research into genetic engineering, medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation. At best, it may be regarded as common ground between States that the embryo/fetus belongs to the human race. The potentiality of that being and its capacity to become a person – enjoying protection under the civil law, moreover, in many States, such as France, in the context of inheritance and gifts, and also in the United Kingdom […] – require protection in the name of human dignity, without making it a “person” with the “right to life” for the purposes of Article 2. […] 369 Case Paton v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8416/79, European Commission of Human Rights, Dec. & Rep. 244 (1980), para. 9. (Thus both the general usage of the term ‘everyone’ (‘toute personne’) of the Convention (para. 7 above) and the context in which this term is employed in Article 2 (para. 8 above) tend to support the view that it does not include the unborn.) 370 Case of Paton v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8416/79, European Commission of Human Rights, Dec. & Rep. 244 (1980), para. 20. (The Commission finds that such an interpretation would be contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.) 371 Case of Paton v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8416/79, European Commission of Human Rights, Dec. & Rep. 244 (1980), para. 19. (The ‘life’ of the foetus is intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant woman. If Article 2 were held to cover the foetus and its protection under this Article were, in the absence of any express limitation, seen as absolute, an abortion would have to be considered as prohibited even where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a serious risk to the life of the pregnant woman. This would mean that the ‘unborn life’ of the foetus would be regarded as being of a higher value than the life of the pregnant woman.) 372 Cf. R.H. v. Norway, Decision on Admissibility, Application No. 17004/90, 73. European Commission on Human Rights Dec. & Rep. 155 (1992), Boso v. Italy, Application No. 50490/99, European Commission on Human Rights (2002).