the judicial human rights system in this regard is a matter that the Court, and not the States, should resolve. To the contrary, the specific purpose of the provisions of Articles 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute of the Court is that the OAS General Assembly, that is the States, be officially informed and, consequently, assume the problem of noncompliance with the Court’s judgments in some cases, and adopt, if they find it pertinent, the corresponding measures. Besides, it is the States that have sovereignly assumed the obligation established in Article 68(1) of the Convention; hence, the problem is their responsibility and they must resolve it. This is the system established in the Convention and, therefore, the Court should not prevent its normal functioning, but rather allow it to operate effectively. The appropriate course, consequently, is to allow the institutional framework established in the Convention to function as it was envisioned. Furthermore, it would not be admissible to justify failing to inform the OAS General Assembly of cases of non-compliance with judgment, such as this one, by the fact that the Court has established a constant and standard precedent, in this regard. As I have stated on another occasion,13 the Court is not only unable to amend the provisions of the Convention, but also its case law does not create law,14 is not binding except for the case in question,15 and obviously can be modified by the Court itself, there being no impediment to this, except the Court’s eventual inclination to adopt a conservative position in this regard. In addition, it is not appropriate to invoke respect for human rights or the pro homine principle16 as a justification for prolonging the regulatory mechanism of monitoring compliance with judgments indefinitely, as in this case, without informing the OAS General Assembly, as established in Articles 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute. This is because the presumption established in Article 65 of the Convention for applying this principle does not exist in this case; in other words, the mechanism of monitoring compliance with judgments is not a prerogative recognized in the Convention, but rather an instrument established in the Rules of Procedure – and not in the Convention or the Statute – to permit the Court to better satisfy the obligation 13 Dissenting opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi with regard to the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Merits, reparations and costs, Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay, of October 13, 2011, III. General considerations. 14 Art. 38.1.d. of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: …d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 15 Art. 59 idem: “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” 16 Art. 29 of the Convention: “Restrictions regarding interpretation No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.” 6