imposed on it by Articles 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute before the OAS
General Assembly and, consequently, susceptible of being required by the latter.
Finally, it would not be justifiable to argue, in support of the position of not complying
with the provisions of Articles 65 of the Convention and 30 of the Statute, even though
a more than prudent and reasonable time has elapsed since the judgment was
delivered without the State having executed its essential aspects, that, by means of
the regulatory mechanism of monitoring compliance with judgments, the Court was
promoting or ensuring respect for human rights, and that this would not happen if it
provided the information stipulated in the said articles.
Moreover, this line of argument would not be justifiable because, as I have stated on
another occasion,17 it ignores the fact that the best guarantee of respect for human
rights is that the Court adapt its conduct strictly to the norms that govern it, especially
those of the Convention. The absolute respect for the “rule of law” that is required of
the States in relation to human rights must also, and with even more reason, be
required from the Court, especially if it is recalled, on the one hand, that its function is
to impart justice with regard to human rights by applying the relevant law, and not to
promote those rights, which corresponds to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights,18 or to create norms that perfect the inter-American system for the promotion
and protection of human rights, which corresponds, as I have already indicated, to the
States;19 and, on the other hand, that it is an autonomous entity in the exercise of its
functions, which obliges it to be extremely rigorous in respecting the norms that
govern it, thus guaranteeing impartiality and legal certainty.
Conclusion
Evidently, I am not affirming, based on the above, that the mechanism of monitoring
compliance with judgments established in the Rules of Procedure is not useful and
even, in some cases, effective. Nor am I affirming that it is not admissible or that it
contradicts the provisions of the Convention or the Statute. To the contrary, what I am
affirming is that, on the one hand, application of this mechanism does not exempt the
Court from fulfilling the obligation established in Articles 65 of the Convention and 30
17
See Note No. 13.
18
Art. 41 of the Convention: “The main function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and
defense of human rights. In the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following functions and powers:
a. to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America;
b. to make recommendations to the governments of the member states, when it considers such action
advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in favor of human rights within the framework of
their domestic law and constitutional provisions as well as appropriate measures to further the
observance of those rights;
c. to prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance of its duties;
d. to request the governments of the member states to supply it with information on the measures
adopted by them in matters of human rights;
e. to respond, through the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, to inquiries made
by the member states on matters related to human rights and, within the limits of its possibilities, to
provide those states with the advisory services they request;
f. to take action on petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority under the provisions of
Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention; and
g. to submit an annual report to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.”
19
See Note No. 9.
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