10 State, by opposing this objection had specified the domestic remedies that had not yet been exhausted and if it had demonstrated that those remedies were available, adequate, and effective. Therefore, this Tribunal admits this preliminary objection in connection with that regulation. 30. On the other hand, in consideration of the arguments made by the representatives related to the attacks at Mr. Chitay Nech’s the home, acts that are within the factual framework of the petition and may have affected his right to property, this Tribunal considers it timely to clarify that it lacks jurisdiction to issue a ruling, because these acts occurred prior to the recognition of the jurisdiction of the Court by the State on March 9, 1987, and do not constitute continued violations that would permit the Court to issue a ruling in this regard. 31. Regarding the lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies in relation with Article 22 of the Convention, the State alleged in the response to the petition that “at no moment was the freedom of movement and residence of the petitioners impeded or prohibited, and as such, it is not responsible for any alleged violation to Article 22.” In this regard, the Court notes that said argument is not a preliminary objection but rather one of merit. Additionally, the Court notes that once the State had identified said argument as a failure to exhaust domestic remedies, it did not establish, in accordance with the generally recognized principles of International Law,18 the domestic remedies that had not been exhausted, and in this case, whether these remedies were available and appropriate, suitable, and effective. 32. Later, in its final arguments, the State provided in a general manner that the Commission did not include in the petition the Articles 21 and 22, nor did it make factual reference to the facts that may have been violations, those of which were not considered in the Report on Admissibility and Merits of the Commission. 33. On the subject, the Court finds that said argument in regards with Article 22 is extemporaneous because the answer to the petition is the proper procedural moment to challenge the preliminary objections of a right claimed for the first time before the Court. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Tribunal reiterates its jurisprudence in the sense that “the alleged victim, his next of kin, and his representatives may invoke distinct rights other than those encompassed in the petition of the Commission, based on the facts presented by it.”19 The Tribunal notes also that the factual framework of the petition establishes facts,20 those of which may lead to legal consequences because of the 18 Cf. Case Velásquez Rodríguez V. Honduras. Preliminary Exceptions. Judgment of 26 of 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 91; Case Garibaldi V. Brasil. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 23 of September of 2009. Series C No. 203, para. 46, and Case Usón Ramírez V. Venezuela. Preliminary Exception, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 20 of November of 2009. Series C No. 207, para. 19. 19 Cf. Case of Five Pensioners V. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 28 of February of 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 155; Case Radilla Pacheco V. México, supra note 12, para. 148, and Case Of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, supra note 12, para. 161. 20 In this sense, the facts noted in the application of the Commission, highlight that Mr. Chitay Nech and other family members fled to Guatemala City as a consequence of the diverse acts of harasmment and kidnapping attempts of Florencio Chitay, and attacks against his home, which occurred in 1980. Likewise, according to the declarations of the family members of Florencio Chitay, transcribed in paragraph 188 of the applicaiton, it is evident that subsequent to the disappearance of Florencio Chitay, at least Marta Rodríguez Quex and four of her sons returned to San Martín Jilotepeque.