230. The representatives indicated that the Bolivian immigration laws applied to the Pacheco Tineo family violated Article 9 of the Convention, insofar as the reasons on which their expulsion was based were not established in a formal law, but rather in a supreme decree issued only by the Executive Branch of the State, which constituted a violation of the principle of legality, applicable to any punitive law. In addition, they argued that, under Article 22(6) of the Convention, States must legislate deportation responsibilities, and the decisions taken in this regard form part of the regulated activities of the public administration and not part of its discretional activities. Consequently, they argued that any limitation or restriction of a right in the latter sphere, must also be established by law, in the sense recognized in the Court’s Advisory Opinion No. 06/86, and that the same conclusion is reached on examining article 7 of the Bolivian Constitution and the ruling of the Bolivian Constitutional Court on the unconstitutionality of several articles of this supreme decree. 231. The Commission did not argue non-compliance with or violation of Articles 2 and 9 of the Convention. 232. The State argued that the application of article 48 of Supreme Decree No. 24423 of November 29, 1996, in force at the time of the events, was preceded by a decision of the prosecutor in order to ensure legal certainty and to avoid any possible abuse or arbitrariness by the authorities. In addition, the State emphasized that the presumed victims had entered Bolivian territory illegally and that the expulsion was implemented after the corresponding injunction had been issued, which ordered that this should be carried out in accordance with the country’s immigration laws. The State asked that the Court declare that it had not been proved that the principle of legality had been violated. 233. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 2, the State argued that “in order to adapt the law as required by Article 2 of the Convention” and, even though the State had not yet ratified this instrument, in July 1988 it “promulgated Supreme Decrees Nos. 19639 and 19640” creating CONARE and establishing the normative for refugees, respectively.” Furthermore, under Supreme Decree No. 24423 of November 29, 1996, Bolivia established the legal framework for the functions of the immigration authorities and, on September 1, 2005, it issued Supreme Decree No. 28329 regulating CONARE and establishing its procedures, “always trying to improve the adaptation of domestic law to the principles of the Convention and of the refugee statute.” It indicated that, in June 2012, it had promulgated Law No. 251, the Refugee Protection Act. The State asked the Court to declare that it had adapted its laws in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention. 234. In its oral arguments, the State alleged that the Constitutional Court’s judgment cited by the representatives precisely applies control of conformity with the Convention, because it affirmed that Bolivia should have laws, rather than decrees, to regulate immigration. It indicated that the said judgment of January 2001 was prior to the facts of this case, which meant that the State, by means of its domestic remedies, had rectified a possible violation of Article 2 of the American Convention, but evidently in just one month – from January to February 2001 – it was unable to complete a democratic process to enact a law on immigration and asylum. Despite this, it argued that the State kept decision No. 25150 of 1998 in force, which had not been declared unconstitutional and that was applied in order to be able to implement the expulsion procedure; hence, no legal vacuum existed at the time of the facts.” B. Considerations of the Court 235. In relation to Article 9 of the American Convention, in other cases the Court has indicated that the principle of legality is one of the central elements of the prosecution of offenses in a democratic society when establishing that “no one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed.” 72