5 assumed, in order to carry out in a manner coordinated with the representatives, the broadcasts regarding the Judgment. 12. Therefore, the Court considers that the compliance of Operative Paragraph eight of the Judgment is pending. * * * 13. In relation to the obligations related to the adoption of diverse legislative measures in electoral matters (Operative Paragraphs nine through eleven of the Judgment), the State informed during the private audience (supra Having Seen 8) that, “as is within the knowledge of the Court, [the Nicaraguan government] has worked on a draft project of reform of electoral law.” Nevertheless, the State indicated that in fulfillment of these measures “has not been executed swiftly […] as it must be,” “not for a lack of will or for the desire to continue manipulating the situation […] in favor of determined political parties, but for a situation of legal conditions and for the lack of consensus by the same parties [...] in the National Assembly.” In the same manner, the State referred to the fact that “for dealing with a law of constitutional range, [the fulfillment of these extremes in the Judgment] imply a partial reform to the Political Constitution,” which, according to the State, is not “of the powers of the Executive Power, but of the Legislative Power.” Also, the State indicated that “[t]he Executive Power possess only the initiative of partial reform.6” Notwithstanding, the State reiterated the will of the State of Nicaragua to comply with the reforms ordered in the Judgment as well as its commitment to give “precise information about the manner in [which] it plans to execute the same.” 14. The representatives indicated in the hearing (supra Having Seen 8) that the State “has presented several versions about what it is doing [in the fulfillment of these measures…], and [that] now […] it signals, trying in any way to exonerate its own responsibility […], that this is something within the competence of the General Assembly and that therefore, due to the complexity of the make-up of the Assembly, it h[as] not been fulfilled.” Also, the State stated that the lack of fulfillment of the Judgment “is of the State of Nicaragua as a whole” but that, nevertheless, “at least one concrete action” has been carried out “that signals that the State has had [the] will to encourage these reforms.” Regarding the reform project mentioned by the State, it signaled that this “not only has not been consulted with the indigenous people, but nor has it entered the legislative flow to generate a discussion.” According to the representatives, “it is this way because it is convenient for the State of Nicaragua that an ambiguous electoral law exists […] because in this way, [the law] can continue to be applied [… in] an arbitrary way and the State can continue to violate the political rights of the Nicaraguan people.” 6 According to the information submitted by the State, “this initiative may [also] be made by one third of the congressmen of the National Assembly. Likewise, this reform shall be carried out according to the procedures established for the partial amendments to the Political Constitution, with the difference that, for being a constitutional law, […] it requires its approval in one legislative period […]. In this topic it should also intervene the political will of the different parties that form the National Assembly, given that to obtain the approval of such partial amendments, it is required a majority of 60% of the congressmen. This means 56 votes in favor, majority that, at this moment, none of the parties has on its own, even if associating with other congressm[en]. This is, there shall be a consensus and political will of all the parties represented in the National Assembly regarding this topic.”