8 November 5, 2003,” that “[i]n addition, although the initial petition was received on August 22, 2003, it was not until April 18, 2005, that the Commission forwarded the pertinent parts of the alleged victim’s petition to the State,” that “[o]n July 18, 2005, the State argued that the petition had been lodged prior to the final decision of the High Court of Justice,” and that “[l]astly, the Admissibility Report was issued on March 9, 2007.”21 Nevertheless, it may be understood from the above that, since the Judgment does not include what was expressly and directly indicated by the Commission, it would appear that its position was accepted; this was that it is at the moment at which the Commission decides on the admissibility of the pertinent petition or communication lodged before it that the obligation of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies should be complied with. In this case, this interpretation would not be in keeping with either the words of the above-mentioned Articles 46(1)(a) and 47(1)(a) of the Convention or their spirit. Indeed, regarding the text of the norms, it should be indicated, first, that although it is true that the Convention does not expressly and directly indicate that, at the time of its presentation, the respective petition or communication must comply with the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, it is also true that it does not indicate, either tacitly or indirectly, that it is sufficient that this requirement is complied with when the Commission rules on its admissibility for the said petition or communication to be admitted. Doubtless, if this had been the intention, it would have been expressly stated in the Convention, but this did not happen. Similarly, it should be recalled that it is undeniable that the Convention does not include a time frame for the Commission to rule on whether or not the petitions or communications lodged before it are admissible; and, consequently, the Convention did not anticipate the situations arising from a delay in this ruling. However, it may be supposed that the wording of the articles cited tacitly considered a certain simultaneity or, at least, a relatively short lapse between the lodging of the petition or communication and the decision on its admissibility. Based on the foregoing, attention may also be drawn to the fact that the said provisions expressly refer to “a petition or communication lodged;” in other words, they refer to a procedural action carried out at a certain moment that reveals its author’s intention. That is to say, it cannot be modified by the latter, unless the author requests that it be considered that the action has not been taken. Second, it should also be considered that, it is with regard to that action, the “petition or communication lodged” that the Commission’s decision on whether or not it is admissible should be made. That is, the Commission must refer to this exactly as it was lodged or completed; the latter at the request of the Commission itself. From all the foregoing, it can be inferred that the said petition or communication is only admissible if, at the time it is lodged or has been completed, the domestic remedies relating to the presumed violation of the human rights that it alleged have been exhausted. Furthermore, this is revealed by the provisions of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure which were adopted by the Commission itself and that, therefore, reflect how it has interpreted the pertinent norms of the Convention. 21 Para. 17.