124. The preceding analysis supports an interpretation of Article 21 of the American Convention that requires recognition of the right of the members of indigenous and tribal peoples to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic development, which includes the right to enjoy their particular spiritual relationship with the territory they have traditionally used and occupied. Consequently, in this case, the right to property protected by Article 21 of the American Convention, and interpreted in light of the rights recognized in Article 1 common to the two Covenants, and Article 27 of the ICCPR which cannot be restricted when interpreting the American Convention in this case, confer on the members of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples the right to the enjoyment of their property in keeping with their communitybased tradition.162 125. Applying this criteria to the present case, the Court concludes that, as indigenous peoples, the Kaliña and Lokono peoples are protected by international human rights law which guarantees the right to the collective territory they have used and occupied traditionally, derived from the use and occupation of the land and of the resources necessary for their physical and cultural survival and, also, that the State has the obligation to adopt special measures to recognize, respect, protect and guarantee to their members the right to communal ownership of this territory.163 126. In addition, the Court considers it important to emphasize that even though the parties have not argued the violation of Article 23 of the Convention during the proceedings before this Court, it finds it pertinent to apply the iura novit curia principle, which “allows it to examine the possible violation of provisions of the Convention that have not been alleged in the briefs presented by the parties, provided the parties have had the opportunity to express their respective positions in relation to the facts that substantiate this.”164 Accordingly, the Court will rule on this right. 127. Based on the above, in light of the arguments of the parties, the Court finds that the violations that have been alleged relate to four main disputes: (a) the failure to recognize the right to collective property and the absence of delimitation, demarcation and land-titling of the ancestral lands of the Kaliña and Lokono indigenous peoples; (b) the granting of land titles and leases to non-indigenous persons within the territory claimed by the Kaliña and Lokono peoples; (c) the adverse effects on use and enjoyment of the parts of the nature reserves that fall within the alleged traditional territories, and (d) the absence of effective participation, by means of a consultation process, with regard to the mining concessions within one of the nature reserves in the ancestral territory. 128. The Court notes that, even though the State has acknowledged the establishment of nature reserves and the granting of mining concessions, these events occurred prior to Suriname’s ratification of the Convention in 1987. Although the State has not filed a preliminary objection in this regard, the Court will take into account its competence ratione temporis in relation to the disputes indicated in the preceding paragraph. 162 Cf. Case of the Saramaka People, supra, para. 95 163 Cf. Case of the Saramaka People, supra, para. 96. 164 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Merits, supra, para. 163, and Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 28, 2014. Series C No.282, para. 305. The State made no comment on the alleged violation of the right of access to information during the merits stage before the Commission, even though it had been advised that the representatives had made these allegations; consequently, the State had the opportunity to state its position with regard to these facts. Also, during the on-site procedure, the State argued that, in Suriname, access to the public records was not denied. 35