aware of the territorial claims of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples and, despite this, without responding to any of their petitions, continued to issue private land titles that prejudiced them, even though they had claimed that the said area was part of their ancestral territory. Thus, the State failed to secure the use and enjoyment of their territory without any outside interference.193 154. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the direct access of these peoples to the Marowijne River has been restricted and, consequently, the use and enjoyment of the traditional lands adjoining the river. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the right of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples to require the restitution of their traditional lands, which are currently owned and in the possession of non-indigenous third parties, remains valid.194 155. However, the Court reiterates its case law that both the property of private individuals and the collective property of the members of the indigenous communities are protected by Article 21 of the American Convention.195 In this regard, the Court has indicated that, when there is a conflict of interests in relation to indigenous claims, or a real or apparent conflict between the right to indigenous communal property and the property of private individuals, the legality, necessity, proportionality and attainment of a legitimate objective in a democratic society 196 (public utility and social interest) must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in order to restrict the right to property, on the one hand, or the right to traditional lands, on the other,197 without the restriction of the latter preventing the survival of the members of the indigenous communities as a people.198 The Court has defined the content of each of these parameters in its case law (case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community199 and subsequent cases). 156. In this regard, it is not for this Court to decide whether the right to collective property of the Kaliña and Lokono peoples should take precedence over the right to private property, because the Inter-American Court is not a domestic court of law that decides disputes between private individuals. This task corresponds exclusively to the State, 200 which must execute it without any discrimination and taking into account the above-mentioned criteria and other activity that would affect their territory, as well as contesting the construction of a house, a filling station, a shopping mall, and a casino. 193 Cf. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, supra, para. 153, and Case of the Garífuna Community of Punta Piedra and its members, supra, para. 233. 194 Cf. Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community, supra, paras. 115 and 116. 195 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 143, and Case of the Saramaka People, supra, para. 89. 196 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 144 and 146, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, supra, para. 156. Regarding the assessment of proportionality, see: Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 51, and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 127 and ff. 197 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, paras. 144 and 145, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, supra, para. 156. 198 Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, paras. 146 to 148, and Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, supra, para. 156. 199 Article 21(1) of the Convention stipulates that: “[t]he law may subordinate [the] use and enjoyment [of property] to the interest of society.” The need for legal restrictions will depend on such restrictions being designed to meet an essential public interest, and it is insufficient to prove, for example, that the law fulfills a useful or timely purpose. The proportionality is rooted in the fact that the restriction must be closely adapted to the achievement of a legitimate purpose, interfering as little as possible in the effective exercise of the restricted right. Lastly, in order to be compatible with the Convention, the restrictions must be justified by collective objectives that, owing to their importance, have a clear precedence over the need for the full enjoyment of the restricted right. Cf. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, supra, para.145 and ff. 200 Cf. Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, supra, para. 136 and Case of the Kuna Indigenous Community of Madungandí and the Emberá Indigenous Community of Bayano and their members, supra, para. 144. 42