26 appropriate measures;94 including having suitable and qualified defenders who are able to act with functional autonomy. 102. The Court considers that legal assistance must be provided by a legal professional in order to meet the requirements of a technical defense in which those subject to legal proceedings are counselled, inter alia, on the possibility of filing remedies against acts that infringe their rights.95 Therefore, the Court confirms that, in the case of criminal proceedings, the defense must be conducted by a legal professional96 because this signifies a guarantee of due process. Furthermore, the defendant must be advised of his rights and obligations and that due process will be respected. In addition, a lawyer is able, among other matters, to carry out a critical and legal control of the production of evidence and can adequately compensate the situation of vulnerability of individuals deprived of their liberty in relation to effective access to justice under equal terms. 103. Roberto Girón and Pedro Castillo were accused of the crime of aggravated rape on April 18, 1993, and the corresponding proceedings culminated in the death sentence. In the instant case, the legal debate is focused on the analysis of whether the right of defense was respected in the criminal proceedings involving the alleged victims and, in particular, whether the State provided them with an adequate technical defense because, according to the Commission and the representatives, they had no legal counsel during at least three procedures and, subsequently, the designated public defenders were law students, which had a negative impact on the result of the proceedings that prejudiced them. 104. It is argued, first, that the alleged victims had no legal counsel during at least three procedures: (a) during the preliminary statements provided by Roberto Girón and Pedro Castillo on April 19, 1993;97 (b) during the confrontation between the two accused on May 5, 1993, and (c) when pre-trial detention was ordered on April 22, 1993.98 Second, that the public defense designated law students to conduct the technical defense of the alleged victims. 105. Regarding these three procedures, the Court notes that: (a) in the case of the preliminary statements, according to the record for each statement, at that procedural stage the judge merely informed Roberto Girón and Pedro Castillo that “no one is obliged to testify against himself,” but he did not ask them whether they wished to make a statement or to keep silent, because there is no record that the deponents expressly accepted to continue the procedure. Nevertheless, they were then questioned and made their statements. In addition, the Court notes that the questions that the judge posed to the two deponents contained an affirmation of criminal responsibility for the facts, even when initially they had not accepted such responsibility; prompting, and leading or catch questions can also be observed; (b) the order of the Second Trial Court of April 22, 1993, requiring pre-trial detention contains no arguments in relation to the situation of Messrs. Girón and Castillo, and there is no record of Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 159, and Case of Martínez Coronado v. Guatemala, supra, para. 83. 95 Case of Vélez Loor v. Panamá. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010. Series C No. 218, para. 132, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 176. 96 Cf. Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, supra, para. 61. 97 Records with the preliminary statements of April 19, 1993, before the first trial judge which reveal that, when providing these, they were advised that they could “propose their own defense lawyer who could be present during this procedure and that they had five days to appoint their defense lawyer; to the contrary, the court would designate defense counsel, ex officio, indicating that this would be done later. Thereupon, they were questioned.” 98 Order of the Second Trial Court of April 22, 1993, requiring pre-trial detention, so that Messrs. Girón and Castillo continued to be detained. In addition, in section X, paragraph 6, of the order, the court indicates that: “within the same period, the common intervenor that they appoint or that the court designates, ex officio, must indicate his domicile for notifications.” And, it was only on April 27, 1993, that the law student, LCC, was designated as Mr. Girón’s defender, and the law student, Edy Iván Bocanegra Conde, was designated as Mr. Castillo’s defender. 94