a precautionary measure involving the pre-trial detention of an accused, but not the safety of persons.” 360. In order to rule on the alleged violation of Article 2 of the Convention, as it has in other cases,357 the Court will only refer to the domestic laws applied to the presumed victims and will not examine the 2008 reform of the Criminal Procedural Code referred to by CEJIL and expert witness Duce.358 Furthermore, the Court will only rule on the grounds of “danger to the security of society,” because this is where the dispute lies in the instant case. The Court notes that these grounds are stipulated in article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applied to Mr. Ancalaf, which regulates the reasons why “pre-trial release [could be] denied” and the reasons or purposes for which it was “understood that arrest or pre-trial detention [was] necessary” (supra para. 304). Under the 2000 reform of criminal procedure, this reason was maintained in article 140.c) of the Criminal Procedural Code as possible grounds for ordering pre-trial detention (supra para. 305). The text of the grounds is almost identical in both codes. Expert witness Duce referred to the regulation of the grounds of “danger to the security of society” in Chile and its interpretation by the courts.359 361. The Court considers that the wording of the grounds of “danger to the security of society” admits several interpretations in relation to achieving both legitimate and non-precautionary objectives. Regarding the latter interpretation, the Court reiterates its consistent case law concerning the standards that should regulate pre-trial detention as regards its exceptional and limited temporal nature, strict necessity and proportionality and, above all, the standards relating to the fact that its objectives should be inherent in its precautionary nature (the objectives of protecting the proceedings according to the needs that are justified in specific proceedings) and cannot constitute a premature punishment that violates the principle of the presumption of innocence which protects the accused (supra paras. 307 to 312). The Court considers that it is not in discussion that States Parties may adopt domestic legal provisions to prevent crime, at times by means of its legal system, particularly criminal law, by imposing punishment, but it should be emphasized that this is not a function of pre-trial detention. 362. Furthermore, the Court notes that, when stipulating these grounds in the said article 140.c) of the Criminal Procedural Code, it was established that, in order to consider whether they had been constituted, “the judge must give special consideration to some of the […] circumstances” described in the norm (supra para. 305). Based on the evidence provided to this Court, it is possible to maintain that this regulation did not prohibit the possibility of the judge 357 162. Cf. Case of the “Children’s Rehabilitation Institute” v. Paraguay, para. 214, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, para. 358 Cf. Affidavit prepared on May 15, 2013, by expert witness Mauricio Alfredo Duce Julio (file of statements of presumed victims, witnesses and expert witnesses, folio 39). 359 Among other points, expert witness Duce explained that “although the grounds ‘danger to the security of society’ admitted the possibility of an interpretation consistent with international human rights law, the way in which it was traditionally interpreted and applied in the context of the inquisitorial system in force, and particularly in this case in which [he is] giving this expert opinion, reveals a problem of compatibility with international human rights law.” In addition, regarding the way the courts apply the said grounds, he explained that “the courts usually understand that ‘danger to the security of society’ will be constituted by the objective presence of one or some of the circumstances listed in the third and fourth paragraphs of article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for example, that the offense in question warrants a criminal sentence, in other words that it is a serious crime as in this case), without the need to justify exactly how, in the specific case that is the object of the decision, the liberty of the accused will constitute this danger to the security of society. […] Indeed, if it is interpreted that, in the case of serious offenses or those that warrant criminal sentences, there is necessarily a danger to the security of society (without any precise explanation), the appropriate decision would be to apply pre-trial detention in all these cases, regardless of their specific circumstances.” He also indicated that “[s]ince no specific meaning is given to the exact scope of these grounds in the cases examined, the defense is prevented from contesting the reasons why this precautionary measure has been requested or ordered, and a rather formal justification of the judges’ decisions is also fostered.” Cf. Affidavit prepared on May 15, 2013, by expert witness Mauricio Alfredo Duce Julio (file of statements of presumed victims, witnesses and expert witnesses, folios 37 to 80). 123