64. In light of the foregoing, the restriction of criminal prosecution in cases of statements of public interest already constitutes a notable advance as promoted in the cases of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela and Palacio Urrutia v. Ecuador. The standards established therein and reiterated by the judgment in the instant case continue to be applicable to cases involving the offense of falsely accusing an individual of a crime. 65. For other crimes against honor involving insults and the attribution of offensive acts, which entail less damage to individual rights, the prohibition of criminal prosecution should not be based on the possible characterization of the statements that gave rise to the subsequent liability as being of “public interest”, but rather on the status of public official of the person whose honor was allegedly affected. 66. The decision on the absolute suppression of criminal measures when their objective is to hold persons accountable for statements involving public officials and which do not include a false accusation of a crime, constitutes one of the most important advances in the defense of the right to freedom of expression promoted by the Inter-American Court. By adopting this criterion, it is no longer necessary to determine the public interest nature of the statement that allegedly attributes offenses or offensive acts. The new standard, by avoiding the mere suggestion of criminal action, serves to mitigate the chilling effect from the first moment it which the enjoyment of this right is affected and, therefore, prevents the weakening and impoverishment of public debate. V. Defects in the legality and specificity of the criminal provisions analyzed in this case a. The criminal offense of insult in the Chilean legal system vis-à-vis the Convention and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court 67. In addition to establishing the standard of absolute incompatibility of the criminal measures of subsequent liability to protect the honor of public officials against the attribution of offenses and offensive acts, the Inter-American Court recognized that the criminal offenses applied in the instant case were not compatible with Article 9 of the Convention. 68. In this regard, we recall that the petitioner’s representatives argued that the criminal offense of insult would not meet the standards of legality established in the American Convention. On this point, a fragment of the petitioner’s statement during the public hearing held on June 20, 2022 is noteworthy: 49 In my case, slander and insult were invoked, slander is basically to accuse someone of a crime, currently to impugn their position, according to our Criminal Code, and that was dismissed because there was never any talk of influence peddling and of unlawful association, it was the press that said that. And slander is what we call a ‘slippery’ concept, which can be used for anything, it is like a void and each judge gives it the content he wants, according to the circumstances. 69. The Commission maintains that, due to its ambiguous wording, the criminal offense is incompatible with the principle of strict legality and with the right to 49 Statement of Carlos Baraona Bray before the Inter-American Court at the public hearing on June 20, 2022.